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Part 1: Introduction and 
background
1. Introduction
In October 2015, the president of the Republic of South 
Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, decreed a change in the 
country’s administrative structure, and increased the 
number of states from ten to 28. 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in 
Opposition (SPLM-iO) had previously suggested a division 
of South Sudan into 21 states, based on the 21 districts 
created by British colonial administration in what was then 
southern Sudan. In parallel with this proposal, the SPLM-
iO even appointed governors, including for states that had 
not been under the territory of the SPLM-iO during the 
civil war waged in South Sudan since December 2013.
Some wanted to keep South Sudan’s ten states intact 
from when the country attained independence in 2011. 
Others argued that it would be better to reduce the 
structure to three provinces (the ‘Greaters’) that existed 
when Sudan became independent in 1956. 
A few weeks later, in December 2015, President Kiir 
appointed governors to head the newly created 28 states. 
The entire process had been accompanied by much 
political speculation and confrontation. What were the 
reasons for this decision? Was it a good decision for South 
Sudan? What interests did it serve? Why did it happen at 
this time? Was dividing South Sudan into 28 states legal 
and constitutional? What would the consequences be? 
How would the subdivision into 28 states relate to what 
had been agreed in the Agreement for the Resolution 
of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) that was signed in 
August 2015? Considerations of what prompted the 
October 2015 presidential decree will continue to be of 
political significance and research interest.
A ‘28 states committee’ was proposed, although its 
exact terms of reference are not clear – whether to consider 
only boundary issues or to review federal states in general 
remains to be seen. The Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD) Council of Ministers stated that 
broader terms of reference were that the committee should 
reach a conclusion on the 28 states within 30 days of its 
formation or the administration should revert to ten states. 
Any new structures would in that case be established 
through a constitution-making process. 
International actors, namely the Joint Monitoring and 
Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), announced that they 
would not recognise the 28 states, adding to the confusion 
of how they might engage with the new structures, which 
in many cases existed only on paper.
In early June 2016, the South Sudanese government 
signalled that it might be willing to review the 28 states, 
despite the fact that new political positions had already 
been created and the structures of the old states had been 
dissolved in some areas. Calls for a referendum on the 
matter of South Sudan’s subdivision became louder.
Despite this brief moment in which the government 
seemed to reconsider the decree, it now seems unlikely that 
it will be altered. The government has at times suggested 
that there is room to increase the number of states, while 
the opposition sought a more in-depth discussion on 
federalism in South Sudan. Whichever way the debate 
goes, it is unlikely that all new states will agree to revert to 
the previous structure. While there are violent tensions in 
some parts of South Sudan that can be linked to the new 
structures, other areas are very vocal in their delight about 
having their own state. The outbreak of violence in Juba 
in July 2016 and subsequent political changes make the 
future even less certain.
The creation of 28 states and the aftermath are only the 
latest events in a long history of debate and practice on 
how to divide South Sudan administratively. Recent steps 
have further invigorated a discussion that has been at times 
acrimonious, at others exploratory. It is intensely political, 
as the latest events have shown. 
The purpose of this report is not to comment extensively 
on the latest events, or to recommend what might be the 
best structure for South Sudan. Rather, its starting point is 
the persistence of the debate in South Sudanese history. It 
acknowledges that, regardless of the next developments, 
there is a need for a structured and informed review 
of the myriad challenges and opportunities that arise 
from different administrative structures. The challenges, 
opportunities and knowledge gaps are vast and varied; 
pulling these together in an accessible way is in itself a 
daunting task. 
Considering the state: Perspectives on South Sudan’s subdivision and federalism debate  7 
1.1. The four factors in South Sudan’s decentralisa-
tion debate
In different ways, four interlinked factors have a long 
history in debates on decentralisation and subdivision. 
Each of these factors, briefly presented here, represents 
a part of a complex reality. The extent to which these 
factors overlap makes it impossible to isolate elements 
of the subdivision debate. Each factor contributes to 
tensions and disputes, but also informs most of the 
arguments for or against further subdivision. The 
arguments are often factual, but sometimes reach deep into 
established narratives of marginalisation or advantage. 
These narratives often closely link power, territory and 
confrontation. Both historical and current conflict is thus 
closely related to the territorial administration of South 
Sudan, and the four factors outlined here highlight aspects 
of importance. 
1. Political rights and political authority are increasingly 
based on claims of ethnic and territorial belonging. 
These are not recent developments, but are rather 
the continuation of long-term processes that have 
had varying degrees of visibility in South Sudan. We 
consider these processes in the section ‘Rights and 
authority’.
2. Boundary changes both create and reflect changing 
definitions of identity. The second factor is thus how 
ethnic and communal identity is shaped in response 
to and also drives changes in territorial administrative 
boundaries, which is outlined in the section 
‘Boundaries and conflict’.
3. Land rights in South Sudan can be summarised by the 
assertion that ‘land belongs to the community’, which 
is in tension with emerging, more exclusive, definitions 
of land rights. Some developments are driven by 
contestations over both land and subsoil resources. 
The section ‘Land, boundaries and identity’ discusses 
this factor in more detail. 
4. The efforts to pay for government salaries and other 
prerequisites of administrative office, together with 
expectations of service provision and development, 
have created pressure to create and control new 
administrative units. This can be called the political 
economy of decentralisation and it is a major 
contributory factor in subdivision and the associated 
debate. We consider this factor in the section ‘The 
political economy of decentralised government’.
Each of these factors helps explain the multi-layered 
relationship between territory, identity, politics, 
administration and conflict. These layers are seldom 
acknowledged in making decisions on subdivisions. While 
South Sudan’s subdivision seems to be driven both in 
practice and in narrative by an understanding that the 
separation of territories, identities and ways of life is 
the best way forward for the country, the reality is that 
the four factors outlined above intersect in ways that do 
not fall along neatly separate lines. Thus considering the 
subdivision debate through the lens of belonging, political 
economy, changing understanding of land rights and the 
interplay between boundary changes and identity is a way 
to delink it from most immediate political considerations 
and to shape it towards one that acknowledges South 
Sudanese history, reality and concerns.
This report starts with a brief overview of commonly 
used terminology in order to clarify our working 
definitions. This is followed by a discussion of the four 
factors mentioned above. The next section engages with 
existing administrative challenges that have been brought 
into sharp focus through the subdivision debate and 
current events – such as revenue collection, service delivery, 
provision of security and implications of subdivision for 
the provision of humanitarian aid, as well as other types 
of international engagement. A final section offers some 
comparative perspectives from Ethiopia, followed by a 
conclusion. 
1.2. The spirit and evolution of this report
This report seeks to summarise considerations and factors 
in order to contextualise the subdivision debate and 
contribute to moving it away from somewhat polarised 
political stances. It is based on a collaborative reflection 
by a group of scholars and practitioners who have 
worked on issues relevant to debates on the subdivision 
and federalism. The group developed the considerations 
presented here, which the editors subsequently compiled in 
the form of the present report. 
This bringing together of many different voices has two 
objectives: 
• To combine different perspectives and knowledge 
for a discussion that fosters a broader, holistic 
perspective on what processes of subdivision might 
mean for South Sudan. 
• To provide accessible and nuanced information 
on a number of topics of concern in creating 
administrative units in South Sudan. 
The report is the outcome of a three-day workshop held 
in early 2016, attended by most of the contributors. During 
this workshop, we discussed at length many different 
perspectives and considerations regarding the then-recent 
creation of 28 states. One striking realisation was the 
difficulty in establishing a shared vocabulary. Terms such as 
federalism, decentralisation and subdivision clearly needed 
clarification.
After the workshop, the collaborators wrote short 
briefing papers on their particular area of expertise, 
focusing on the histories of their areas of concern, 
knowledge gaps and the possible implications of the 
potential further subdivision. The two editors then 
compiled these briefing papers in a form that would allow 
the various considerations to speak to each other. The 
report is thus a joint effort that represents the collective 
knowledge of this group, including contradictions and 
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1.  The Soviet Union was a notable exception to this description, which despite its federal structure held strong central power. 
differences of opinion.  We hope it can help to guide debate 
and inform decision-making in a constructive way.
2. Terminology: federalism and 
decentralisation 
When South Sudan became independent in 2011, there 
had been no conclusive preparation for the system of 
governance the country might adopt. Federalism was 
among the options discussed (Johnson 2014), and has been 
a much-debated possibility for governing South Sudan. 
The political backlash against the 28 states proposal – and 
against previous attempts to discuss federalism – also 
highlights the fact that the multi-faceted and long-running 
debate about administrative structures in South Sudan has 
blurred definitions. Some regard the creation of 28 states 
as an attempt to become federal, while others consider it a 
move to strengthen centrally held power. This points to the 
need to clarify the terminology. 
Although the central concepts of territorial subdivision 
continue to be debated, we adopt some commonly agreed 
basic definitions. A federation is characterised by a 
constitutionally guaranteed devolution of power from the 
centre to regional units and representation of these units 
in the central government. These features create a shared 
sovereignty between federal and national entities that is 
not found in unitary states. Federalism is not, however, 
mentioned in the Transitional Constitution of 2011, 
which in fact indicates that South Sudan should follow a 
decentralised system (Chapter 3 section 47). 
Decentralisation can be defined as transfer of power, 
responsibilities and finance from central to subnational 
levels of government, such as the provincial or local level. 
This transfer of power does not have to be constitutionally 
defined and protected, and the subnational units do not 
necessarily have their own representation at the national 
level, as in a federal system.
Both federalism and decentralisation promise to allow a 
broader range of groups to participate in decision-making 
processes and thus give them reasons to invest in the 
political system, rather than to undermine it. Effective 
federal systems also place significant checks on the abuse 
of power at the centre by giving constitutional power to 
regions. At the same time, decentralisation promises to 
bring decision-making power closer to ordinary citizens, 
which may increase the level of political participation and 
lead to more responsive government. 
There are many ways to classify and categorise 
decentralised and federal systems. One is to look at the 
division of powers and resources between the central and 
the regional or local level. Some systems remain more 
centralised, with national governments largely retaining 
power, responsibilities and resources. Others devolve a 
larger share of resources and powers to subnational levels. 
Federal systems are often classified according to how 
they came about. Did they result from the subdivision of 
a formerly unitary state in order to unify a fragile and 
diverse territory – a ‘holding-together’ federation’? Or 
did they arise from formerly independent states coming 
together and sharing the responsibilities, for example, for 
defence and other areas that can best be met through a 
centrally coordinated body than through separate states – 
typically known as confederation, or a ‘coming-together’ 
federation? In holding-together federations, central 
governments tend to be more powerful, while in coming-
together federations, the constituent units usually have 
formally equal power.1
The various forms of federal and decentralised systems 
underline the fact that institutional and legal frameworks 
of federal or decentralised systems do not exist in a 
vacuum, but are determined by the interplay of political 
and economic structures. Evidence on the impacts of 
decentralisation on development is therefore ambiguous 
because many other factors shape the way in which 
decentralisation is initiated, designed and implemented 
(Local Development International 2013; Faguet and Poschl 
2015).
Fiscal issues are essential parts of intergovernmental 
relations, and reflect the relationship between structures 
(the provisions in the law and the constitution), processes 
(the fiscal policies that are implemented), and society 
(the economic realities of the state). Another essential 
issue is the way the ruling political parties are organised. 
Decentralised party systems will create decentralised 
federations. Similarly, centralised party systems will create 
centralised federations. Informal political structures also 
matter, which means that personal relationships influence 
how structures are used. 
A premise of this report is that neither federalism nor 
decentralisation alone can resolve any country’s problems. 
The impact and possible outcomes of a territorial 
subdivision in South Sudan cannot be understood without 
considering the context in which the reforms are being 
implemented – how major political, economic and 
social realities interact with the new structures, powers 
and responsibilities introduced. Territorial subdivision 
cannot resolve governance challenges at the centre. On 
the contrary, effective central governance is essential for 
a decentralised or federal government to function, as the 
interplay between the central and constituent (state and 
lower tiers) governments is crucial. 
2.1. Institutional features of a federal system
While a decentralised system may take many forms, 
federations have some institutional characteristics in 
common (see Elazar 1987; Watts 1998). These are:
1. A central bicameral system combining regional and 
central representation.
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The first or lower chamber usually serves to represent 
the interests of the federation as a whole and as a power 
base for the central government. The second or upper 
chamber serves as representative institution for the 
constituent units of the federation. In federal systems, 
like that of the United States, the second chamber serves 
to check the power of the other federal institutions and 
plays an essential part in the separation of powers. In 
parliamentary federal systems, such as those of Australia 
or Canada, the second chamber ensures that the national 
government consults with regional units on all legal 
actions.
2. Constitutionalism and an independent 
constitutional interpretative body.
The emphasis of constitutional guarantees in federations 
implies that the government is subject to the law and must 
be committed to the principle of constitutionalism, which 
effectively means limiting its powers. These self-imposed 
constraints are intended to make  the rulers accountable 
to the law and prevent arbitrary actions. An emphasis 
on the rule of law in regulating the relationship between 
central and regional level makes the interpretation of the 
constitution of great importance. Those who interpret 
it should be independent of political influence, which is 
why most federations rely on the courts to play the main 
adjudicating role in interpreting the constitution and 
adapting it to changing circumstances. In most federal 
systems, an independent constitutional court has the same 
function. It is essential that this court is autonomous of 
political forces, so that all parties can regard it as impartial 
and trust its decisions.
2.2. Decentralisation: devolution and deconcentration
Ribot (2002) outlines the complexities of implementing 
decentralisation policies in the African context, defining 
decentralisation as when ‘central government formally 
cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a 
political-administrative and territorial hierarchy’. 
The literature distinguishes between two main kinds of 
decentralisation. The first is essentially an administrative 
process, often called deconcentration, where power and 
resources are transferred to local branches of the central 
state. The second type is devolution or political/democratic 
decentralisation, which means that power and resources 
are transferred to locally elected authorities representative 
of and accountable to the local population. This type of 
decentralisation implies that devolved responsibilities 
have an element of downward accountability, whereas 
deconcentrated ones remain primarily accountable to 
central institutions. Ribot and others see deconcentration 
and devolution as weaker or stronger forms of 
decentralised government – see Bizet (2002) on the same 
issue in France for instance.
Delineating the exact differences between forms 
of decentralisation, the devolution of powers and 
deconcentration, is the subject of major discussions in 
the field of public administration. The key distinction is 
between ‘deconcentrated’ and ‘devolved’ state agents. Both 
categories have separate but often (partially) overlapping 
tasks, but belong to different accountability and reporting 
structures. Often deconcentrated bodies are accountable 
to superiors in the same institution, who are based at the 
central level. As Ribot further points out, ‘they may have 
some downward accountability built into their functions, 
but their primary responsibility is to central government’ 
(Ribot 2002: 2). 
In newly decentralising systems there is commonly some 
form of confusion or ‘dual subordination’ of combinations 
of deconcentrated and devolved organisations. 
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2. This section is largely based on Johnson (2016).
Part 2: Four factors 
in South Sudan’s 
decentralisation debate
3. Rights and authority 
When the president issued the decree on the 28 states, 
it was not the only proposal for subdividing (or re-
dividing) South Sudan. Nor was it the first time that 
issues of internal boundaries, belonging, security and 
revenue collection had become primary administrative 
concerns. The historical relationships between structural 
and administrative concerns and the people living under 
these structures highlight long-standing challenges. To 
understand these, it is useful to look at the history of 
provinces and districts in South Sudan, which continues to 
shape reality and debate today.  
3.1. The evolution of provinces and districts2
At Sudan’s independence in 1956, the southern Sudan was 
divided into three large provinces: Upper Nile, Bahr el-
Ghazal and Equatoria. This division was not arbitrary, but 
reflected prevailing circumstances since the composition of 
the provinces had changed over time.
One major factor in how the provinces looked in 1956 
relates to security. It had been common in southern Sudan 
to place neighbouring communities who were in conflict 
under the administration of the same province so that 
conflicts could be more easily resolved. This was based on 
the view that proximity was a way to resolve conflicts, one 
of the two approaches to conflict resolution.
Security was the initial concern of the Anglo-Egyptian 
government in creating provinces. Before 1930, the focus 
was on preventing the different southern Sudanese peoples 
from fighting the government. After 1930, the colonial 
rulers were keen to prevent southern Sudanese peoples 
from fighting each other. The prevention of inter-communal 
fighting, often leading to anti-government uprisings, 
was the main reason why the Nuer, Anuak, Murle and 
Dinka people of Jonglei were placed under the single 
administration of Upper Nile.
The Dinka people of the two Duks, Kongor and Bor 
were at one time part of Mongalla Province – Mongalla 
being the capital of Equatoria until 1930 – and the tribal 
boundary between the Dinka and their Nuer neighbours 
became the provincial boundary. This simply meant that 
local disputes escalated to inter-province disputes and 
were more difficult to resolve, and the Dinka people were 
amalgamated with Upper Nile (Johnson 1982). As early 
as 1905, the Dinka of northern Bahr el-Ghazal were 
incorporated into Kordofan so that a single administration 
could deal with their complaints against the Humr Baggara 
(Johnson 2008: 4). Later the Ruweng Dinka and their 
Nuer neighbours in Bahr el-Ghazal became part of Upper 
Nile as the Western Upper Nile District (Johnson 2010: 
57-58).
Not all districts comprised a single ethnic group. The 
so-called ‘tribal confusion’ around Wau defeated any 
possibility of administration based on purely ethnic lines, 
and not all ethnic groups retained their territory in a single 
district. The annexation of the Malual Dinka grazing lands 
south of the Kiir/Bahr el-Arab to Darfur in 1918 laid the 
foundation for the contemporary ‘Mile 14’ dispute about 
one of the most contested parts of the border between 
North and South Sudan (see, for example, Frahm 2015). 
After the introduction of Native Administration in 
the 1920s and 1930s, the government’s chief interest was 
the creation of native courts whose main function was to 
administer customary law and organise work parties and 
the collection of taxes. This led to a further reorganisation 
of districts. The Nuer people of Bahr el-Ghazal were 
incorporated in Upper Nile so that all Nuer-speaking 
administrators and all Nuer courts were under one 
administrative jurisdiction. The Dinka of Yirol District 
were re-transferred from Upper Nile to Bahr el-Ghazal 
and amalgamated with the Dinka of Rumbek District to 
become Lakes District.
3. This section relies heavily on Johnson (2016).
4.  Rotation still happens in some areas, for example in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, but administrators are usually from the same state/county or the same 
ethnic group or subgroup.
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Some transfers were driven by improvements in 
transport and communication. The Zande kingdoms 
had originally been connected to the nineteenth-century 
Turco-Egyptian province of Bahr el-Ghazal by the caravan 
routes of the zariba system, and were re-incorporated into 
the Anglo-Egyptian province of Bahr el-Ghazal after the 
defeat of King Gbudwe, the last Azande king, in 1905. 
A new road system linking the Azande more closely 
with their eastern neighbours made it possible to detach 
Zande District from Bahr el-Ghazal and incorporate it 
into Equatoria in the 1930s. The Uduk and other Koman-
speaking peoples had been transferred from Blue Nile 
to Upper Nile at the end of the 1930s, but a new road 
running parallel with the Ethiopian border constructed 
during World War II made them more accessible to 
Kurmuk and they were sent back to Blue Nile in 1953 
(Johnson 2010: 75-78).
3.2. South Sudan’s subdivision debates3
Debates about federalism and self-rule shaped the political 
struggle of people in South Sudan before and after the 
independence of Sudan in 1956, highlighting the close 
connection between territory, political rights and belonging 
on which this section focuses.
During the 1947 Juba conference there was no mention 
of any structure of government, although it is often 
claimed that the first demand for federalism was voiced 
then. In fact, Buth Diu, the leader of the Liberal Party, 
first proposed federalism in 1951, when he was a member 
of the Constitution Commission, and it was the rejection 
of that proposal that led to the adoption of federalism at 
the 1954 Juba conference. The 1954 vote for federalism 
was overwhelming among political leaders of southern 
Sudan, but the establishment of a centralised government 
in Khartoum ended this debate. The central government 
regarded southern leaders who had demanded federalism 
as traitors. 
The call for federalism came up again during the 
period of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, local government officers were still regularly 
rotated to different districts and provinces. Since then, 
however, it is increasingly assumed that the staff in local 
government administrations should be from the area of the 
administration’s jurisdiction.4 In a sense this has brought 
local government closer to the people, strengthening 
citizens’ identification with the local administration. But 
it has also produced political rivalry and tensions within 
local government units, particularly when administrators 
are suspected of bias towards their own ethnic or sub-
ethnic group. In the history of southern Sudan, such 
community-level conflicts often led factions to break away 
and settle elsewhere. Currently, the same tendency has led 
to the subdivision of administrative units or chiefdoms.
During the second civil war, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement Army (SPLM/A) pushed for a 
unitary state with some elements of decentralisation. 
Dr John Garang’s vision of a ‘New Sudan’ supported a 
unitary, united Sudan against the idea of an independent 
or federated South Sudan. Nevertheless, the SPLM/A 
supported devolution of power from the centre to local 
communities – expressed in wartime slogans like ‘the land 
belongs to the community’ and ‘taking the town to the 
people’ (see, for example, Badiey 2013; Hirblinger 2015). 
The federalism debate re-emerged strongly after South 
Sudan gained independence in July 2011, but was similarly 
controversial. The 2011 ‘Equatoria Conference’ (and 
subsequent conferences in 2013 and 2014), convened 
by intellectuals and political elites from the Equatorian 
region, demanded federalism. The first conference was 
followed by renewed war in 2012 between South Sudan 
and Sudan because Sudan’s alleged theft of South Sudan’s 
oil, leading South Sudan to stop oil production. States’ tax 
collection from non-oil revenues became centralised by the 
government in Juba to make up for the lost earnings. These 
developments in turn led to criticism of the government 
and a repeated call for federalism, particularly from states 
whose revenue did not depend on oil. 
By 2014, discussions of federalism were considered a 
national security concern, partly because of the perception 
that a request for decentralised government also implied 
a wish to diffuse centrally held power. Others interpreted 
the debate as a push towards a renewed kokora – the 1983 
division of the south into three regions that translated into 
excluding non-Equatorians from Equatoria. In addition, 
South Sudan’s experience of a very powerful central 
government has contributed to the belief among those 
living outside Juba that a federal system might be able to 
address such challenges. Whether indeed federalism can 
offer solutions to the problems of governance associated 
with centralisation of powers remains, however, a major 
question. 
4. Boundaries and conflict
Local and national violent conflicts are often the lens 
through which outsiders look to understand how stable 
South Sudan is, or how well it functions. It thus makes 
sense to look at violent conflict specifically in relation to 
administrative structures. In the first few months following 
the creation of the new states, there have been further 
tensions and conflict over some of their proposed or 
assumed new boundaries.
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In addition, if decentralisation is experienced in practice 
as the tightening of government control over local lives, 
this increases the likelihood of conflict against the state 
or other authorities. People may face and imagine new 
security threats from newly constructed communities, 
political disputes and new forms of government. Either 
way, real and continued possible division of the states 
brings heightened uncertainties as well as hopes. It is 
therefore likely that there will be a growing demand for 
reassurance through adequate security provision. 
Conflict and violence are usually expressed in South 
Sudan in three ways, all of which are in some way 
connected to identity, political economy or boundaries. 
The three ways are, first, through violence that arises 
from identity, territory or access to resources. Second, 
conflict emerges in its resolution, that is, by agreeing on 
a peace settlement in which the causes of conflict are 
openly or inadvertently identified and can in that way 
become the conflict narrative. Examples of this retroactive 
identification of the causes of conflict include the 
anchoring of political power or wealth sharing in a peace 
agreement, or regulating the presence of armed troops, 
or indeed the identification of ethnicity in assignment 
of positions. A third way that conflict is seen is in the 
narratives of possible conflict scenarios, which are a way to 
indicate levels and types of tension between communities 
or individuals.
The conflict since 2013 has made violence of different 
types highly visible. The ARCSS has identified elite access 
to power as well as presence of troops in close proximity 
to the seats of political power as drivers of conflict, and 
conflict narratives of confrontation and division have 
created further tension. It is primarily in these conflict 
narratives of potential, as well as the identification of 
problems through peace agreements, that we can seek a 
link between administrative subdivision and possibilities 
for violent conflict. 
The intractability of conflicts in South Sudan derives 
from their complex local dynamics and the frequently 
changing linkages with national politics and developments 
in the larger region. Land issues have played a particularly 
important role both in generating poverty and in driving 
and sustaining protracted conflict. Conflicts over land may 
be communal and strictly local, but they have increasingly 
become entwined with political rivalries on a larger 
scale. They are also ‘ripe for political manipulation, as 
unresolved land disputes have consistently underscored 
wider conflict’ (Pantuliano 2009: 167).
4.1. History of boundaries and conflict
The connection between administrative structures and 
violent conflict is most visible in the limited repertoire 
of outside interventions for resolving violent conflicts in 
South Sudan. There are essentially only two approaches 
reflected in current and past attempts to resolve or control 
violent conflict. The first approach is enforcing separation 
of groups that are in conflict. This has been the approach 
mostly – but not always – taken by outsiders, as the brief 
history below shows. Separation is achieved through strict 
lines of division, which can be drawn administratively, 
through leadership or through social norms that make 
interaction difficult, broadly mirroring theories of 
consociationalism – a form of power sharing based on the 
assumption that the segmentation of society can become 
the building block to overall stability (McGarry and 
O’Leary 2005). At times, communities simply choose their 
own separation by fleeing conflict to seek safety elsewhere. 
The second approach to the resolution of violent 
conflict is to enforce proximity. This means in practice that 
communities are brought together through intermarriage, 
the need to share territory or resources or through trade. 
Proximity and the need for cooperation make violence 
too costly. This broadly follows integrationist models of 
administration and is most often pursued if conflicts are 
resolved at the community level.  
Those administering South Sudan have not always 
strictly applied only one approach. At times policies have 
been mixed. Administrators during the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium used both separation and proximity – the 
history underlines that the western Nuer people, for 
example, were initially in Bahr el Ghazal so that they could 
be administered together with Dinka people in order to 
pre-empt raiding.  
These two approaches to managing community 
relations and avoiding violent conflict broadly describe the 
history of thinking on how to best govern Sudan and South 
Sudan. Both are tightly linked with finding administrative 
structures that can control violence. Enforcing proximity 
is the idea that underpinned theories of a New Sudan. 
Enforcing separation manifests itself at the national level in 
South Sudan’s independence. Yet even before independence, 
enforcing separation as a way to deal with conflict could 
be seen in the attempt to demarcate counties along lines 
that separated communities. 
Further fragmentation can be seen as another 
manifestation of an attempt to pacify or resolve conflict 
through separation. This sets up conflicting dynamics, 
however, as in the past conflict in South Sudan was 
often mitigated by keeping the dividing lines between 
communities blurred through intermarriage or seasonal 
agreements regulating interaction. 
4.2. Subdivision and violent conflict
It is not clear whether violence causes administrative 
division or division causes violence. The proliferation 
of local violence often seems to be in parallel with the 
expansion of administrative structures, the quest for 
further expansion, or the experience of power being 
consolidated at the centre. Recent violence in Yambio, 
Raja or Wau, for example, seems to have increased with 
the assertion of central power over the matters of the state, 
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including the dismissal of officials and the presidential 
order that has divided the previous states. 
There is no reason to believe that division into 28 states 
(or any other number) will do away with local conflicts, 
but they are likely to be re-configured. There will be new 
majorities and new minorities within the new states and 
differences between them may be sharpened. As conflicts 
evolve, what may appear to be the root causes are also 
likely to change over time. 
Does violence lead to administrative fragmentation? The 
most obvious manifestation of violence as a driving force 
for administrative fragmentation is South Sudan’s civil 
war, which created the momentum towards the ARCSS, the 
opposition’s call for 21 states, the presidential decree for 28 
states and the ensuing debate on further subdivision. Both 
government and opposition have made decentralisation 
a central issue, although they word it in different ways 
and have suggested a different type of expansion of 
administrative units. Implicitly, the suggestion that further 
fragmentation offers a better administrative structure for 
South Sudan also makes clear that the government and 
opposition alike interpreted the structure of the ten states 
as possibly being more conducive to violent conflict than 
other structures. 
It is in the way the debate on subdivision and the 
national peace agreement has been conducted that a 
direct link emerges or is created. Peace and administrative 
structures go hand in hand, as does the widely held 
expectation that close access to administrative structures 
is a way to preserve interests. Considering that the South 
Sudanese experience has been one of ‘administrative-
division-follows-violence’, interests in further subdivision 
could potentially create more violence, replicating what 
has been the most efficient way to have interests of 
administrative division acknowledged and achieved. 
4.3. Violent conflict and administrative challenges
One of the great challenges in South Sudan’s 
administration is the existence of parallel and often 
conflicting structures, which create murky relationships 
of authority and accountability, as discussed above. One 
could argue that the different types of violent conflict in 
South Sudan mirror the existing administrative structures. 
It is a further indication that political power is exercised or 
established through violence. 
The complicated relationship between devolution and 
deconcentration is also visible in the way that conflicts 
develop and evolve. There are what might be called 
‘devolved conflicts’, which are locally driven, for example 
through personal or land disputes. 
There are also what could be considered ‘deconcentrated 
conflicts’, which have a strong link to or even originate in 
the centre and it is only the visible violence that shifts to 
the local level, while the ‘command centre’ sits elsewhere. 
Deconcentrated conflicts are extremely difficult to tackle 
since their manifestation is local although the impetus 
comes from the centre, thus bypassing local structures. 
A good and often cited example of the difficulty of 
addressing deconcentrated conflicts is the tension regarding 
the movement of cattle. While local structures to manage 
cattle movement worked for decades, this becomes more 
complicated if the cattle owners do not themselves tend 
their herds but rather hold powerful positions at the centre. 
4.4. Lessons about administrative structures and 
violent conflict
A number of lessons can be drawn from existing 
knowledge on how violent conflict links to the expansion 
of administrative structures in South Sudan. 
It is clear that the establishment of structures does not 
guarantee their function. For example, the establishment 
of a state government over smaller territory does not 
necessarily mean that it is more accessible to citizens if 
there are no local structures to hold state government to 
account. Similarly, the signing of a peace agreement and 
the establishment of new administrative structures does not 
equal peace. Thus there is a lesson to be drawn from how 
we think about peace agreements and decentralisation. 
Peace agreements are usually seen as a written record 
that reflects a state of negotiations, and of political 
power, indicated by who was at the negotiating table. 
South Sudan has seen many national-level or local-level 
peace agreements that set out various principles about 
how people want to engage with each other, followed 
by concrete steps that are expected to change how they 
will interact in the future. A central idea that has been 
reflected in a number of peace agreements is that of power 
sharing, often accompanied by finding ways to implement 
it through devolved structures. To a lesser extent, peace 
agreements have highlighted the need for all South 
Sudanese to benefit from such agreements, including people 
living far from the seats of power. A direct link between 
processes of decentralisation and attempts to solve violent 
conflicts is thus firmly established in assumptions about 
conflict resolution. 
Although the signing of a peace agreement usually 
generates enthusiasm about the possibility for change, 
experience has led to widespread disillusion. It is thus 
important to analyse the reasons for such disillusion and 
how these might link to a process of decentralising South 
Sudan. 
One way to think about the link between 
decentralisation and peace agreements is to identify 
what the implementation of a peace agreement means to 
different people. People might support peace agreements 
for very different reasons, which at times can become 
conflicting incentives. Some might see a peace agreement 
as a starting point that allows for the expected benefits 
of peace to reach the local level. In these expectations 
decentralisation is probably a good thing as it might 
facilitate the translation of the benefits of peace if the 
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Map of the 28 states of South Sudan
administrative units are more directly connected to the 
centre of implementation. 
Others might view a peace agreement signed at the 
centre of power as the exact opposite: a way to consolidate 
power at the central level. This view starts from a different 
understanding of how the centre and periphery in South 
Sudan are linked. Contracts between elites drafted in the 
centre make the assumption – or at least imply – that 
there is a strong relationship between the centre and the 
periphery, meaning the agreement will have an impact on 
the periphery. A different view is that the signing of a peace 
agreement might become a way to centralise real power 
given that the periphery remains disconnected. This reality 
plays out regardless of whether administrative structures 
suggest otherwise. 
4.5. Conflict mitigation and boundaries
Traditional leaders and particularly chiefs continue to be 
the main actors in the mitigation and resolution of local 
conflicts, partly because of the limited capacity of the 
Ministry of Justice to reach the whole country. A major 
shift in the role of chiefs in mitigating and resolving 
conflicts was the inclusion of the chieftainships established 
by the British colonial authorities in local government 
structures, enshrined in the Local Government Act (LGA). 
The LGA and the Land Act mandate chiefs to be the 
primary focal points for conflict mitigation, particularly 
conflicts associated with land. What has not yet been 
clarified, however, is the exact level of authority granted to 
different types of chief. Even within the same jurisdictions 
there continue to be disagreements regarding the authority 
over land administration between chiefs appointed by the 
SPLM/A during the war and those who claim legitimacy on 
basis of the appointment of their forebears by the colonial 
authority. 
This adds an extra challenge to finding ways to 
mitigate conflicts, particularly those that involve cross-
border concerns and different types of chief, for example, 
management of resources such as grazing land and water 
points. This particularly affects cattle-herding communities, 
whose movements have been historically determined by 
availability of resources rather than borders and whose 
movement is in some areas particularly contentious. 
5. This section relies heavily on some of the central findings of a comprehensive original report (Leonardi and Santschi 2016), which also includes references 
for further reading.
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5. Land, boundaries and identity5
Throughout history, the interplay between people, land 
and power has been powerful and continues to be a major 
factor in South Sudan’s subdivision debate. One way to 
look at debates over land is that these follow a gradual 
trajectory of territorialisation of political concerns, as 
outlined in the section above on the history of South 
Sudan’s subdivision. 
Before the colonial period, the southern Sudanese 
region was characterised by considerable migration and 
mobility, some of which was in response to the violence 
of ivory and slave traders in the nineteenth century. Even 
when people were relatively settled they still moved 
around a lot, whether to practise shifting agriculture or 
transhumant pastoralism. Individuals and families also 
migrated to escape hardship or conflict, and joined other 
communities through prior relations, marriage or by 
becoming the client of a wealthy family. Ethnic groups, 
sections and clans were therefore not defined in strictly 
exclusive or clearly bounded terms, but were constantly 
changing as they absorbed new people, subdivided and 
migrated. The members of a single clan were frequently 
scattered across considerable distances, and even across 
different ethnic or sub-ethnic groups. The British colonial 
authorities tried to map out the territories and boundaries 
of ethnic groups, but had to admit that this was impossible 
due to the intermixing of different groups and lack of 
clear boundaries between them. Communal boundaries 
are seldom clearly demarcated but are defined more by 
particular points in the human and natural landscape – 
and these scattered points cannot be neatly joined up by 
drawing a line.
The relationship between people and land is nevertheless 
deeply important. Spiritual and political authority has 
often been based on the claim to be descended from 
ancestors who first settled in a particular place and cleared 
the land, giving their lineage a special ritual power and 
responsibility in relation to the health and fertility of 
the land and its inhabitants. Such beliefs continue to be 
respected. Sacred sites and ancestral graves are crucial 
to people’s sense of belonging to a particular place and 
community, while access to arable and grazing land is vital 
for their livelihoods. Settlement in the same territory has 
also been as or more important for binding together or 
even creating communities than more distant relations of 
ethnicity or kinship.
Nevertheless, pre-colonial political authority was 
based more on control of people than of territory or land. 
Colonial officials often complained about their confusion 
over tax collection, for example, when a particular chief 
or headman had to travel considerable distances into 
neighbouring chiefdoms to collect taxes from ‘his’ people. 
For this reason, it was probably under the colonial 
government that the first efforts were made to create 
more strictly defined and bounded territorial units of 
authority and administration, in which all the inhabitants 
would pay taxes to the same chief. The colonial practice 
of forcing people to construct and maintain roads within 
their chiefdom also meant that these formed boundaries 
between chiefs’ territories. It was along the roads that 
boundary markers were erected between different districts 
and provinces. 
In general the colonial government did not undertake 
a comprehensive delineation and demarcation of internal 
boundaries, other than to settle particular grazing disputes 
or communal conflicts. Even in cases where they did mark 
a boundary on the ground, such markers have often long 
since disappeared, other than in the memories asserted 
by local elders. Even such apparently clear boundary 
markers as streams or hills are often disputed. The idea 
that colonial district or chiefdom boundaries provide 
a clear basis for defining contemporary boundaries is 
therefore somewhat misleading. Moreover, as discussed 
above, districts were not based on single ethnic territories, 
but were multi-ethnic units – sometimes deliberately so, 
in order to better manage inter-communal relations and 
prevent conflicts. Even some chiefdoms included people 
from more than one ethnic group, as in the Maridi area, 
for example. 
The lines drawn to make up colonial districts and 
provinces thus gradually contributed to the creation of new 
political identities. The most obvious of these new political 
identities was the emerging category of ‘Equatorians’, 
which is an example of specifically connecting people 
so that ethnic or linguistic lines do not coincide with 
territorial boundaries. It is important to remember that 
administrative structures shape the identities of those who 
live with them, particularly as South Sudan seeks the most 
appropriate administrative structure for the country. What 
seems to be a possibility with its further decentralisation is 
South Sudan’s adoption of a federal model, whereby states 
or districts are created along linguistic, religious or ethnic 
lines and assumes their distinctiveness, more in line with a 
consociational approach (Abbink 2011). 
In pursuing different models, it tends to be overlooked 
that lines make groups just as much as groups can 
influence where lines are drawn. 
5.1. Land and natural resources
The more local government administrations become 
identified with a particular ethnic group or section, the 
more significant the boundaries of these administrative 
units become, because they are seen to define communal 
boundaries and associated control of land and resources. 
At the same time the widespread assertion that ‘land 
belongs to the community’, associated with the SPLM, has 
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contributed to more exclusive and exclusionary definitions 
of communities and their customary land rights. Land 
is perceived to have gained new commercial value in the 
past decade or so with the emergence of new urban land 
markets. Moreover, people anticipate more commercial 
agriculture and resource exploitation, as well as leases 
or compensation for land used by the government or 
international agencies.
Customary land rights do not imply exclusive 
ownership, but rather involve multiple layers of rights, 
from individual usufruct rights to communal control of 
natural resources and negotiated rights of access to grazing 
or water in another section’s territory. Any attempt to 
demarcate boundaries is therefore likely to be perceived as 
a threat to some of these rights, and provoke neighbouring 
groups to try to assert rights on a more exclusive basis 
of ownership. In at least some areas, very small clan 
units hold communal land rights, so the logic of making 
communal and administrative boundaries contiguous 
could result in ever smaller administrative entities. In 
other areas, communal territories are not continuous and 
their boundaries are not linear. Usually specific points are 
known as boundary markers. Boundaries and boundary 
markers are contextually negotiated and defined in the 
event of a dispute over a piece of land in a contested area 
(Leonardi and Santschi 2016). 
Administrative boundaries are not demarcated 
either. Given the conflation of community territory and 
administrative entities and the blurred and contested 
nature of community boundaries, it is challenging 
and potentially contentious to define boundaries of 
administrative entities. With the emergence of new 
administrative entities so new boundaries will also 
develop. These may be contested and give rise to disputes. 
Community members might, for instance, fear that they 
will lose land rights if an administrative boundary cuts 
through communal boundaries. 
The same tensions might emerge – and have done so 
in the post-28 states debates – in relation to higher-level 
state boundaries, and indeed to parts of South Sudan’s 
international borders, where particular ethnic groups or 
sections argue that the boundary should correspond to 
their own customary land boundaries, which are at times 
also disputed by neighbouring groups. Such disputes 
often focus on particular symbolic sites or developments 
relating to identity and resources, such as signposts and 
place-names, new buildings, services, roads or commercial 
activities, or expanding urban and administrative centres. 
Town centres were originally alienated as government 
land, but as towns have expanded in size and economic 
significance, they are now subject to competing claims to 
communal ownership of urban land. Even at the most local 
level, the construction of fences or concrete buildings or 
the use of tractors for commercial agriculture can spark 
new disputes over the land concerned, which often escalate 
into conflict between neighbouring groups and their 
respective local administrations. 
At the same time, however, people recognise the value 
of strength in numbers, and some boundary disputes centre 
on alleged attempts by particular groups to expand their 
boundaries in both territorial and demographic terms, 
to ensure recognition as a large population and hence a 
viable and influential unit. In the past, the division of South 
Sudan’s old provinces into smaller states has not always 
facilitated the resolution of cross-border conflicts, and 
even within the ten post-2005 states there were border 
disputes between counties (Schomerus and Allen 2010; 
Justin 29 July 2015). This has been because administrative 
boundaries may prompt conflict over land, boundaries and 
resources. During the CPA, these occurred mainly in the 
newly created counties. 
There is a recurrent tension here. On the one hand 
is recognition of the value of larger units that bring 
together and help to maintain peace between neighbouring 
ethnic groups. On the other hand there is the danger 
that minorities feel threatened or excluded within such 
units, and therefore press to have their own unit to better 
safeguard their rights. The exclusion of outsiders conflicts 
with prevalent phenomena such as migration, urbanisation 
and the development of a nation state. Subdivision of 
administrative entities based on community entities may 
also enforce ethnic and community boundaries and foster 
the exclusion of ‘outsiders’. 
However small the unit, there will always be majorities 
and minorities by some definition. The real problem is 
that, at all levels, local government administrations have 
become identified with particular ethnic groups or sections, 
which means that they are increasingly seen as a means 
of defending communal interests, resources and territory 
rather than protecting the rights or meeting the needs of all 
citizens.
5.2. Language and identity
South Sudan is ethnically and linguistically diverse. Some 
maintain that the conflict that erupted into an open war 
in December 2013 had its roots simply in rivalry between 
the two largest ethnic groups: the Dinka and Nuer people. 
Others argue that the conflict was never driven by ethnicity 
but was caused by a disagreement within the ruling 
political party. Whichever view one takes, the arguments 
rarely veer far from the conclusion that the conflict soon 
assumed an ethnic dimension.
In a multi-ethnic state, one of the key aims of federalism 
is the holding together of a nation by containing, if not 
curtailing, the excesses of ethnic and regional aspirations. 
The two main opposing trends in the debate on federal 
systems have centred between those who argue that 
federal subdivision would lead to further integration 
of the subnational groups and those who claim that it 
would reinforce both the desire and capacity for groups to 
separate from the state (Horowitz 1997). 
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At independence most African countries regarded 
federalism as anathema. It is thus not surprising that 
when the president decreed the 28 states, the fundamental 
problems of ‘ethnic heterogeneity‘ and the ‘failure of 
national integration’ that have been prominent in African 
countries since gaining political independence almost 50 
years ago, did not feature largely (Selassie 2003). 
Rights, authority and territory are closely connected to 
identity. Identity creates what language is used or its use 
can create identity. Language is a strong element in how 
identity is shaped, and both are also closely connected 
with territory. Where is a language spoken and by whom? 
Where does one language end and another begin? Does a 
language border constitute a dividing line or a connection? 
Language, identity and ethnic diversity will be of prime 
importance in any administrative structure in South Sudan. 
Issues of diversity need to take into account past, present 
and possible future ramifications. It is clear from the 
debate that ensued after the 28 states were decreed that 
people’s sense of identity was being challenged. Former 
group loyalties continue to be tested and then either shed 
or replaced by new ones that are distinct from the former 
ones. New ethnic and language minorities have been 
created within the new states, as new state boundaries 
create different majorities in smaller administrative units. 
This continues a longstanding trend. From colonial 
times, ethnic considerations have been at the forefront of 
most political decisions on territorial administration in 
South Sudan. The colonial administration used language 
and ethnicity to delineate provincial boundaries and put 
communities together, exemplified in the Rejaf Language 
Conference of 1928 (Abdelhay, Makoni, and Makoni 
2016). This has surfaced again in recent debates as 
definitions of ethnicity are mutable, interpreted differently 
and change in response to other political developments. 
There seems to be some uncertainty in South Sudan 
about whether it is better to acknowledge the country’s 
ethnic diversity or to ignore, if not suppress, it altogether. 
Two examples illustrate this ambivalence. First, in the 
distribution of political offices ethnic considerations never 
seem to be far from the surface. For instance, the key 
national positions of the Presidency, the Vice Presidency 
and the Speaker of the National Assembly, before the 
eruption of the conflict of mid-December 2013, went to a 
Dinka (Bahr el Gazhal), a Nuer (Upper Nile) and a Bari 
(Equatoria) respectively. The situation was no different in 
the ARCSS. The same set-up was more or less retained: 
Presidency (Dinka, Bahr el Gazal), the newly created post 
of First Vice President (Nuer, Upper Nile) and the Second 
Vice President (Bari, Equatoria). Equatoria is also slotted 
in for the post of the Speaker of the National Assembly 
as compensation for being relegated to the second vice 
presidency. 
Following the events of December 2013, the government 
released a slogan that many interpreted as an attempt 
to downplay South Sudan’s heterogeneity and diversity: 
‘One nation, one people’. The slogan seemed to have 
been informed by the notion that stressing diversity could 
encourage divided loyalties and fuel separatist tendencies. 
Selassie (2003) however, warns that denying ethnic 
diversity can create tension, disorder or even nationalism 
that borders on ethnic militancy – the very opposite of 
integration through diversity. 
Ethnic diversity is often expressed through claims on 
territory. These are, in turn, tightly connected to language 
use, as we discuss in the next section. 
5.3. The language dimension
There are about 72 indigenous languages in South Sudan 
and the country’s various ethnic groups identify and are 
associated with particular languages. Language is never 
neutral, as social, personal and other affiliations colour 
the choice of words and language used. Social prejudices 
include political, religious, ethnic and familial/clan 
alliances. These identities are not fixed or rigid but are 
fluid and dynamic. Language is often the main way that 
one ethnic group is distinguished from another, and an 
associated territorial border is often related to linguistic 
identities. Yet these borders do not accurately reflect the 
fluidity of language-based identities. 
Language also affects the ways in which identities are 
perceived, articulated and suppressed. The people of the 
Equatorian states have voiced concerns that the names 
of newly created states are diluting their identity as 
Equatorians – an identity that itself is also a remnant of 
a previous structuring of administrative units. There have 
been calls for the name Equatoria to be attached to all 
states located in the Equatorian region. 
Any restructuring of the states should not have any 
significant impact on the development and the use of all 
languages in education as the Constitution gives the same 
status to every indigenous language. The fact that some 
of the proposed new states are now predominantly of one 
language group should simplify language planning and 
material production at the state level, or at least invigorate 
the debate on the link between language, identity and 
territory. 
5.4. The value of a name: language and resources
When new territorial entities are created and borders 
drawn in oil- and mineral-rich countries, the fortunes 
of individuals or groups are affected in different ways 
as benefit-sharing arrangements are altered or reshaped. 
Some communities or groups will gain while others will 
lose, which in some cases leads to conflicts. Who gains or 
loses out is often dependent on factors such as identity and 
connections to political elites. 
Many oil- and mineral-rich countries, such as Nigeria, 
have faced conflicts linked to borders and names 
(Bobenhorn and Bruck 2006). Often, these conflicts emerge 
from the national level in cases where leaders are keen 
to control resources directly or through their ethnic or 
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loyal groups. Creating new territories, changing borders 
and naming places is an established way to control 
resources. The interests of those thought to be disloyal 
or untrustworthy may be denied as these measures are 
implemented. 
The creation of new territorial units and redrawing 
of borders is often linked to changing or introducing 
new names as a way to alter the identity of places. The 
actions of leaders of the previous unified Sudan illustrate 
this. Shortly after the discovery of oil in Sudan in 1978, 
President Jaafar Nimeiri and other northern elites devised 
a plan to redraw borders, create new administrative units 
and rename places as a way of way to bring the oilfields 
firmly under their control.
In December 1980, President Nimeiri instigated the 
former Sudan National Assembly to pass a decentralisation 
bill that included a map indicating ‘obvious and even 
deliberate encroachment upon the territories that were 
ostensibly part of Southern Sudan’ (Badal 1986: 144). The 
territories that were to be excised from southern Sudan 
and included in northern Sudan included the copper- and 
uranium-rich area of Hufrat El Nahas and the oil-rich 
area of Bentiu. Later, Nimeiri created a new state in the 
then autonomous southern Sudan region and named it 
al-Widha or ‘Unity’ and placed it under his office. Despite 
this, Southerners continued to use the 1972 Addis Ababa 
Agreement as a means to delegitimise Nimeiri’s actions and 
agitated for a share of revenues of the soon-to-be produced 
oil. To deal with this challenge, in June 1983 Nimeiri 
decreed the re-division of the south into three mini-regions, 
ending the Addis Ababa Agreement. This weakened the 
ability of Southerners to collectively challenge central 
government policies, and was a major factor in the 
resumption of war that same year.
Other governments have adopted a similar strategy. For 
example, under Saddam Hussein in Iraq, many Kurdish 
areas were given new Arabic names as a way of exerting 
control over these areas, which Kurds had claimed as their 
own (Natali 2001). Reasserting identity through displaying 
a minority language has worked effectively, for example 
in Wales, where road signs are all written in Welsh and 
English.
Similarly, as elites in Khartoum pushed through naming 
and other measures to put oil areas under control of loyal 
populations in the north or under the president, southern 
Sudanese, especially those living in the oil-rich areas, 
became determined to oppose the new boundaries and 
names. 
After South Sudan’s independence, border conflicts 
persisted despite international efforts to lessen tensions.6 
It has been very difficult to agree on a border between 
the two Sudans because the oil wells lie in this border 
region. Neither of the two countries has been willing to 
compromise and in fact went to war over the oil-rich 
area, which the Sudanese called Heglig and the South 
Sudanese Panthou, encapsulating the political significance 
of place-names. 
The way in which people respond to decisions regarding 
names and territory depends on how these were made, for 
instance whether they were genuinely consulted. It is quite 
certain that in the present violent context of South Sudan 
many people who are displaced and face a humanitarian 
crisis will find it hard to trust centrally made decisions. 
This in part because of the fear that the changes will 
adversely affect existing rights in oil or minerals, especially 
agreed revenue-sharing arrangements. In the ten states, the 
national, state and local community authorities understood 
their entitlements to the oil revenues. This is likely to 
change as the new entities demand their share of the 
revenues, which might in turn fuel grievances and conflict.
Oil companies will have to deal with new structures, 
which will be expecting other benefits in addition to 
revenues. Often communities in the oil-producing areas 
expect development assistance from the companies, in part 
to compensate them for the negative consequences of oil 
exploitation, such as environmental pollution. This creates 
another layer of complication.
Changes related to control of resources also have an 
impact on ethnic relations, which in many cases already 
have been damaged by the experience of violence. When 
borders are drawn or altered along ethnic lines, the 
location of resources will become even more contentious. 
Groups that feel that they have been unfairly treated may 
invoke their ethnic identity to mobilise and to explain their 
loss. In this context, the demand for federalism was locally 
constructed as a way to force communities to return to 
their ancestral areas in order to reduce competition over 
resources, particularly land. This could worsen ethnic 
tensions. These considerations are important to take into 
account when borders and names are changed. 
6. The political economy of decentralised 
government
Government is far more than a way to administer territory 
and people. It is also its own machinery that comes with 
its own political economy: with interests, benefits, agendas 
and incentives. Decentralisation or subdivision should 
therefore be seen as both the realisation as well as the 
driver of ambitions and interests. During the negotiations 
for the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the 
design of South Sudan’s government was influenced by 
the need to integrate government structures into the peace 
negotiations and the implementation period. 
The IGAD-led mediation for the CPA did not discuss 
federalism as such. Rather, the negotiations focused on 
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the tiers of government and what powers each would 
hold, including how the tiers related to the principles of 
decentralisation and the devolution of powers that were 
to be implemented at all levels of government. Thus the 
2005 CPA provided for the establishment of territorial 
subdivision in Sudan and for four autonomous tiers of 
government: 
• National  
• Autonomous regional for southern Sudan 
• State government
• Local government 
The decentralised system of government on which the 
parties to the CPA agreed could in practice have been 
a federal system as it established its core elements. The 
national, regional and state tiers of government were 
designed to act with three branches (executive, legislature 
and judiciary). The principle of subsidiarity was the basis 
for allocating tasks to the different levels of government 
with well-defined exclusive, concurrent and residual 
powers. In addition, each tier of government was formally 
granted political and fiscal competence to spend its own 
revenues. 
Southern Sudan’s Interim Constitution (ICSS) of 2005 
established the structures of government for then southern 
Sudan. These structures were to remain in place regardless 
of the outcome of the referendum, with people’s vote for 
either secession or for the structures established through 
the CPA. Thus the ICSS was drafted to remain in force 
regardless of secession or unity and the decentralised 
system established during the CPA period was to continue 
in the sovereign and independent South Sudan until 
the adoption of a permanent constitution. The Local 
Government Act of 2009 (LGA) further stated that local 
governments have three levels: the county, the payam 
and the boma (equivalent to city, municipality and town 
councils in urban areas).
With South Sudan’s independence in July 2011, the 
Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS) was 
promulgated to manage the transitional period until the 
adoption of the permanent constitution. Unlike the ICSS, 
the TCSS has some of the features of a centralised unitary 
system. One departure from the ICSS is that the TCSS 
states that the government’s authority is derived from 
the constitution and the law rather than the ‘will of the 
people’ – which is inconsistent with the concept of shared 
sovereignty that rests with the people in a typical federal 
system. 
Further, the TCSS does not meet some key aspects 
of a federal system such as the autonomy and political 
competence of tiers of government. In particular, the 
TCSS gives exceptional powers to the President of South 
Sudan to remove an elected state governor and/or dissolve 
state legislature in the event of a state crisis that threatens 
national security. The exact mechanisms through which 
such powers can be exercised are not clear and there is no 
clear institutional check on them. Moreover, unlike the 
ICSS, the TCSS centralised previously decentralised services 
such as the judiciary, public attorneys, police, prisons, 
wildlife and the fire brigade, but did not provide for the 
establishment of a state judiciary as one of the branches of 
autonomous government. 
In comparing the two constitutions, it can be argued 
that after gaining independence, South Sudan departed 
from a decentralised federal system. Its current system 
of government exhibits features of unitary system. These 
tensions and ambiguities persist despite the reforms 
introduced in October 2015. 
The Presidential Establishment Order Number 36/2015 
states the core objective in creating 28 states is the 
devolution of powers and resources to bring both of these 
closer to rural people by gradually reducing the size of 
national government, attracting national experts to work 
in states and local governments and promoting social and 
economic development in rural communities. As such, the 
creation of 28 states is not meant to establish a federal 
system but to decentralise powers and resources to lower 
levels of government. It remains an open question whether 
the creation of 28 or any number of states will indeed 
decentralise powers and bring resources closer to the rural 
population. 
Order 6 of the Presidential Establishment Order 
36/2015 and subsequent amendments in the TCSS have 
overall affirmed the states’ existing powers. The size of 
national government does not seem to have reduced, 
nor have the national experts and civil servants been 
transferred to the states and local government. No 
additional resources have been allocated for promoting 
social and economic development in rural communities. 
Thus the reality is not so much about decentralisation as a 
proliferation of units driven by the promise of better access 
to resources and power. 
It appears that South Sudan’s current subdivision is 
being pursued in an institutional framework that is neither 
decentralised nor federated. The division into 28 states 
has not amounted to devolution, but has strengthened 
presidential powers to create more states and appoint state 
governors. At the same time, the number of states and their 
boundaries remains particularly contested between the 
SPLM and the SPLM-iO, as the latter seeks to restructure 
states in a way that would be beneficial to them by 
providing access to natural resources.  
It can be seen that the central executive power 
undermines the core federal principles of regional 
autonomy, as many of the local government functions 
are deconcentrated rather than devolved. Sometimes, 
deconcentrated power structures are established because 
political offices are awarded on the basis of loyalty to 
the centre, which then continues beyond the apparently 
decentralised appointment. It is anticipated that this will 
create further challenges and competition as a permanent 
feature of administering South Sudan – an issue that has 
little to do with the number of states. 
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One challenge that the new administrative structures 
will face concerns the personnel. Capacity is an issue. 
While many central ministries have struggled to employ 
the qualified personnel they need, this problem is likely 
to be still greater at the levels of state and county 
administrations. With the new subdivision of states, the 
pool of qualified staff will further dilute. Second, in a 
situation of subdivision it is likely that staff decisions 
will be made on the basis of origin. Third, devolved state 
functionaries, at least in the lower administrative grades, 
used to work in their home state. Each state had a pool 
of civil servants who could be employed in the various 
counties. Does the creation of new states mean that 
the pools of civil servants for each state will be further 
subdivided? A fourth concern relates to the unofficial 
hierarchy between levels of government. With the creation 
of new states, it is likely that certain states will remain 
more powerful and more attractive to work in than others. 
At the same time, the central government will probably 
continue to attract the best educated and experienced 
administrators. 
6.1. Competing hierarchies in devolved and decon-
centrated South Sudan
Debates about decentralisation and federalisation often 
focus on the division of responsibilities and powers 
between various levels of government. Competition 
between levels of authority on key issues such as 
revenue collection, natural resource management or the 
organisation of security exist in every country and in any 
system of government. 
The distinction and relationship between 
deconcentration and devolution in a single government 
system is highly relevant for South Sudan, as it is the 
system that the country has been following both formally 
and informally. To fully understand the legal framework 
that defines the authorities of the various levels of 
government in South Sudan, the CPA and subsequent 
legal frameworks such as the LGA and the Transitional 
Constitutions are crucial. Importantly, the everyday 
exercise of authority is often more complex than legal 
provisions might suggest. We distinguish three challenges 
facing South Sudan:
• Due to inconsistencies between the various 
legal frameworks, there is room for multiple 
interpretations of the roles and responsibilities of 
each level of government. This is particularly clear 
in relation to the administration of land ownership.
• Various authorities interpret the legal provisions 
loosely, mainly because unwritten and informal 
hierarchies are more important. Moreover, different 
categories of government officials operate under 
entirely different accountability and command 
structures. 
• In each state there are appointees from the 
central government authorities. The security 
forces, for example, have control over state and 
lower government authorities because they are 
directly accountable to the central government. In 
difficult situations, this central power at the local 
level could add to strained relationships between 
representatives of the central and state authorities. 
The interim period also highlighted the potential for 
conflict based on the administrative structures. Specific 
policies – at times designed to address previous injustices 
or to ease tension – became counterproductive and at 
times contributed to conflict, which rose significantly 
during this time particularly in rural areas (LeBrun and 
McEvoy 2010). Although conflicts have multi-faceted 
and often intertwined roots, competition over natural 
resources and land played a role as communities struggled 
to position themselves in the most beneficial way under 
the new structures (Hirblinger 2015; Deng 2015;  Deng 
2011;  (Schomerus and Allen 2010). This resulted in 
a proliferation of local government structures as local 
government was the only way for communities to gain 
access to resources. Although not explicit in the existing 
laws, ethnic identity seems to have played a central role in 
the establishment of some governance units, particularly at 
the county level. 
Competition for power and positions in local 
government has been driven by several factors. After 2005, 
government salaries formed the main ‘peace dividend’,7 
fuelling the drive for more administrative units and hence 
positions. Such positions also potentially brought access 
to income from local trade and taxation, including chiefs’ 
court fees, market taxes and land allocations. At the same 
time, non-government organisations (NGOs) and other 
agencies tended to focus their activities in particular 
counties, payams or bomas, encouraging the wider 
perception that development funding and services were 
more likely to come to a particular area if it was recognised 
as a unit in its own right. Becoming a new county is seen to 
establish a stronger relationship with government and the 
associated development agencies. 
Electoral politics added a further layer of significance 
and contention to these units. They were now also 
political constituencies, as individual politicians increased 
expectations of constituency development or used rivalries 
or boundary disputes to gain support from constituents. 
This also means that when people want to assert political 
authority or claim rights and resources, they have 
increasingly done so on the basis of their membership of 
a particular community. This in turn can lead to defensive 
reactions from individuals or groups who fear being 
marginalised by dominant communities or excluded from 
rights to land, resources or representation. Increasingly, 
therefore, people argue that their particular section or clan 
should have its own county, payam or boma, defined by 
communal territorial boundaries. 
It is important to keep in mind the extent to which the 
creation of more counties caused tension and at times 
7. The term peace dividend is now commonly used to describe benefits of peace, and is how it is used here. Originally the term referred to budgetary shifts 
from the war effort to financing public services. 
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violence. Likewise, political contestations at the higher 
political order filtered down to cause social frictions, 
sometimes along ethnic lines. The civil war that was 
triggered by the events of December 2013 is an example 
of such conflation of political and social contestation (De 
Vries and Justin 2014). 
6.2. Competition between centrally and locally 
appointed state officials 
Despite what is stated in the TCSS and in the provisions 
of the CPA, South Sudan’s system of government was 
at all times largely centralised. One reason for this is 
the inconsistency between command and accountability 
structures of deconcentrated and devolved government 
authorities described earlier. Learning from the past means 
recognising the possibility that the establishment of new 
states and other administrative units further increases the 
risk of different and contradictory interpretations of roles 
and accountability structures, since a new framework 
of government needs to be developed, and new state 
boundaries need to be determined. 
The process of determining the boundaries and 
assigning responsibilities is particularly important for 
revenue collection and security. Both domains have direct 
impact on people’s lives and would appear, therefore, 
to fall to local government. Formally, governors and 
county commissioners are the highest public authority 
in a given territory. They also share responsibilities with 
deconcentrated state officials employed by the Ministry 
of Finance, as a taxation inspector or customs officer, for 
instance. These deconcentrated state functionaries based in 
a state or county are under direct orders from the capital 
and are not accountable to the public in the area where 
they work. Despite the principle that commissioners and 
governors are the highest public authority in the area, such 
officials are unlikely to report to local authorities but tend 
to go directly to the agency’s superiors in Juba. 
The highly centralised system of governance, combined 
with a strong focus on internal and external security, 
has also resulted in situations in which decentralised 
authorities, even though officially in charge of security 
within their territory, are overruled by agencies that are 
under a different chain of command. Some of the police 
departments are part of such a deconcentrated command 
structure, such as the traffic, customs, and immigration 
departments. 
The experience of local government in South Sudan, 
particularly with regard to revenue collection and security, 
shows that two causes have contributed to potential 
conflict between the decentralised and deconcentrated 
forces. The first one is institutional and has to do with the 
implicit dominance of the central government authorities 
over local or state government authorities. This hierarchy 
is felt not only by officials working in both strands of 
government, but also experienced in similar ways by 
people in their everyday interactions with the state. The 
divergence between upward and downward accountability 
that deconcentrated and decentralised officials feel towards 
their superiors and local citizens only exacerbates this 
sentiment. 
Second – a more elusive yet arguably more important 
aspect – is the significance of the personal background of 
officials representing the various strands of government. 
In the first few years after the signing of the CPA, 
state officials operating in deconcentrated government 
departments often had a military background with roots 
in the SPLA, while devolved state agents, including 
those in the state and county police, were more often 
formed in the various systems of civilian governance. 
Most governors had a military background, while this 
was less true of lower political positions like county 
commissioners, especially in the second half of the Interim 
Period. In a country emerging from a liberation struggle, 
the importance of a military history – preferably in the 
SPLA and not one of the other military groups – turned 
out to be a crucial asset in the implicit hierarchy between 
state officials operating at different levels of government.8 
This little articulated hierarchy of military life histories 
shaped the reach of central government into lower levels of 
authority. 
The last issue that is likely to come to the fore is the 
issue of personal trajectories during the war. This used 
to be a question that referred to the side former soldiers 
who became state officials had been on during the war 
against Khartoum – whether they had ever ‘switched sides’. 
The new war that started in December 2013 sharpened 
and created fault lines at all levels of the administration, 
among politicians and in the army. With the power-sharing 
agreement and – at the time of writing – the subdivision 
of ten states into 28 smaller ones, there is a possibility that 
administrative and political positions will be awarded to 
people who were on the ‘good’ side during the war. This 
might impede collaboration and trust between various 
branches of the (deconcentrated and decentralised) 
government and line ministries in a given region. 
6.3. Peace agreements, constitution-making and 
federalism since 2013
The eruption of civil war in December 2013 raises 
fundamental questions about its causes. Weak institutions 
and non-compliance with the (weak) constitution 
probably played a part, as did attitudes towards systems 
of governance. During the peace negotiations to end 
the civil war, the government was reluctant to discuss 
federalism and convincingly argued that this was a topic 
for the permanent constitution-making process that will 
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8.  For a detailed description of the impact of this hierarchy on the everyday governance of the border, see de Vries 2013. 
involve the people of South Sudan. The IO argued that 
as a popular demand federalism should be immediately 
implemented during the transitional period of peace 
agreement.
In order to resolve these positions, the mediators 
successfully suggested recognising federalism as a popular 
demand in the preamble of the peace agreement and 
making a federal system one of the principles of the 
constitution. With the signing of the peace agreement, 
the popular demand for a federal South Sudan was thus 
explicitly recognised as the system of government to guide 
the constitution-making process. 
The government’s decision to create 28 states has 
raised questions and confusion. It is unclear whether 
this is intended to establish a federal or a decentralised 
system and whether it will realise the vision of the SPLM 
of ‘taking towns to the people’. At the same time, the 
creation of 28 states, including the subsequent doubts and 
confirmations, has also provided opportunities for South 
Sudanese to further discuss federalism. Questions were 
asked about the policy objectives of federalism, whether 
the aim was to create unity through territorial federalism 
or to promote self-rule through ethnic federalism or 
a combination of both. Were states or counties the 
appropriate tiers of government? Would boundaries 
between administrative units be decided by ethnicity, 
territory or economic viability? How would rural people 
and people with different backgrounds be consulted on the 
matter? 
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Part 3: Addressing 
challenges
The debate on and practice of subdivision in South Sudan 
is unlikely to subside, regardless of whether 28 states will 
remain or another structure adopted.  The number of 
states is less important than understanding the underlying 
challenges. This section outlines some of these challenges 
and points towards ways in which these might be debated. 
These challenges highlight that no number of states or 
changes of administrative structure will automatically end 
violent conflict and establish more peaceful realities. There 
is a need for a deep consideration of the challenges and 
how to address them in any administrative arrangement. 
7. Revenue and services
Governing any number of states requires serious 
consideration of how to fund subnational governments. 
Revenue collection became a heated issue linked 
to administrative powers when in 2012 the central 
government decided to centralise this as a way to cover the 
deficit caused by the closure of oil production. As a protest 
against this move, some state authorities (particularly 
the three states of Equatoria) reactivated the debate on 
federalism in 2013, which at the political level was seen as 
a way to regain control of the revenue collection ‘hijacked’ 
by the central government. Irrespective of the number of 
states, without attention to the fiscal architecture in general 
and revenue assignments in particular, no arrangement will 
be able to leverage the fiscal structure to support peace.
7.1. Paying for government and services: 28 states 
and revenue
Although there is a tendency to view decentralisation as 
a purely technical exercise, it a deeply political endeavour 
and its fiscal dimensions are arguably at the heart of 
how power will be redistributed. Thus the current 
decentralisation debate serves as a unique opportunity 
to reform the country’s revenue system across all levels 
of government, but requires a close eye on how this will 
affect the distribution of political power. While there are 
also a number of ways to decentralise fiscal institutions, 
there is no blueprint for how to proceed (Smoke 2013: 13). 
Decentralisation efforts should be based on how to ‘look 
for ways to improve capacity and coordination among 
public stakeholders at different levels of government to 
increase the efficiency, equity and sustainability of public 
spending’ (Charbit 2011: 5). Nonetheless, this debate is 
likely to be shaped by evolving conflict dynamics. 
To date, discussions on the creation and potential 
implementation of a federal system in South Sudan have 
largely neglected revenue considerations. This omission 
is problematic for at least three reasons. First, revenue 
and expenditure determine how levels of government 
function and relate to each other. Second, the way 
revenue is collected, the sources of revenue a government 
depends on and the decision-making processes regarding 
public spending, collectively shape how citizens relate to 
government. Third, fiscal systems can play an integral role 
in implementing peace processes.
In more recent years, oil revenues and international 
humanitarian and development assistance have been 
important in supporting government budgets and the 
provision of essential public services. This has allowed 
the fiscal considerations that usually form part of 
decentralisation decisions to be somewhat bypassed. 
This is not to say that no direct taxes were introduced or 
collected, as is often assumed, but that their contribution 
to overall revenue was negligible. 
South Sudan’s relationship with international aid began 
in the 1980s as war was waged against the Khartoum 
regime and oil dominated Khartoum’s finances by the late 
1990s. At a smaller, but still vital, scale, records show that 
during the civil wars between the Khartoum government 
and the south, the SPLA collected taxes from the local 
population. The SPLA’s collection of such taxes might 
have in part have replicated colonial governance patterns, 
as they included cash and in-kind items, such as food or 
housing (Johnson 2003; Rolandsen 2005). 
The legacy of each of these successive state-building 
attempts informs South Sudan’s current, at times 
overlapping, revenue system. For example, both state 
and the national government have the right to levy taxes 
according the Part 12, Chapter 4 of the Transitional 
Constitution, while the Tax Act and the LGA detail 
separate national and state-level taxation privileges. These 
legislative ambiguities contribute to on-going disputes 
between the Ministry of Finance and state ministries of 
finance. These conflicts especially affect oil-producing 
states, as well as those that host trade routes, such as the 
former Eastern and Central Equatoria. 
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Traders importing goods from neighbouring countries 
are also affected. They complain of being illicitly taxed at 
multiple points, which in turn increases the cost of living 
in certain parts of the country as most goods come from 
other parts of East Africa. Disputes over the distribution 
of finances have also long simmered in South Sudan. 
For example, conflicts over how oil revenues should be 
redistributed among Sudan’s different regions, including 
what is now South Sudan, arguably contributed to the 
vote for independence in 2011 and debates continue 
today. There have also been longstanding disputes 
over the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system, with 
disagreements regarding how block and conditional 
transfers are made from the central to state governments. 
Given its longstanding problem with generating revenue, 
South Sudan government’s current dependence on oil and 
aid revenue makes sense, although it is still a pressing 
concern due to the volatility that oil dependence creates 
in revenue. Furthermore, research on different types of 
revenue sources and the quality of governance suggests 
that governments that depend on certain types of aid 
and oil windfalls might be less capable, accountable and 
responsive to citizens’ demands (Clist 2014; Bornhurst, 
Gupta and Thornton 2008). Though the relationship 
between taxation and the quality of governance is 
complex, the theory suggests that governments that depend 
on revenues generated from domestic sources rather than 
from extractives, have stronger incentives to respond to 
taxpayers’ demands, and therefore realise more of the 
assumed benefits of decentralised governance (Moore 
2015).
With all this in mind, efforts to develop other revenue 
sources, and especially direct tax revenue, must not be 
neglected. It is therefore troubling that rather than direct 
taxation, customs revenue constitutes most of the country’s 
non-oil and non-aid revenue. Despite this, contrary to 
popular opinion, and despite South Sudan’s overwhelming 
reliance on non-tax revenue, there are accounts of some 
authorities, including soldiers, collecting informal taxes 
from local communities and traders (Schomerus and Titeca 
2012). Some local chiefs, or other types of traditional 
authority continue to raise revenue from their communities 
in the form of financial and in-kind taxes. While such 
efforts have led to conflict over which authority has the 
right to generate local revenues, both of these patterns 
arguably reflect the region’s history of colonial rule and 
civil war. 
Any fiscal decentralisation in South Sudan will need 
to address the country’s unique political, economic and 
social factors. These include longstanding difficulties in 
generating taxes, dependence on oil and aid revenue, and 
uncertainties regarding how finances should be collected 
and shared among different levels of government. In 
addition to respecting longstanding governance patterns, 
several lessons can be drawn from decentralisation efforts 
in other countries. There are at least three ways in which 
the discussion might usefully take shape: 
1. Revenue and expenditure inform how levels of 
government function and relate to each other.
Much of the existing mistrust between the Ministry 
of Finance and state ministries of finance is caused by 
ambiguous roles set out in the Transitional Constitution, 
the Local Governance Act and the Tax Act. As these are 
largely matters for central government, there is a need for 
high-level coordinating institutions to establish clearer 
processes for how finances should be distributed. Ideally, 
central government officials will lead in providing political 
support for changes in consultation with representatives 
from the states. But rather than introduce a new process, 
these discussions could possibly be incorporated into 
the existing Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Working 
Group (IFRWG), which already has some experience with 
these issues. The IFRWG’s key roles could be to improve 
coordination across different levels of government and 
advise local and central governments. Although the IFRWG 
was originally limited to the finance ministers from the 
existing ten states, it could be extended to include inputs 
from prospective ministers of finance from all 28 proposed 
states. 
To mitigate disputes regarding how oil revenues 
should be equitably, sustainably and reliably distributed 
to states, the IFRWG might also continue discussions 
on the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system. This 
is an especially pressing concern, given the continued 
likelihood that states will need to rely on transfers from 
the central government to cover shortfalls in their ability 
to generate tax revenue. The present transfer system risks 
centralising political power in the national government, 
since information about the volume of revenue generated 
in the country, particularly from oil, is politicised and often 
opaque. The formula for calculating the redistribution of 
revenues from the central government to states, and from 
states to the central Ministry of Finance, is also disputed. 
States also complain of frequent delays in conditional and 
unconditional transfers, which in turn erode their efforts to 
function and administer local public services. 
2. The form of revenue collection and decision-making 
on redistribution shape citizen–state relations. 
How a government decides to collect and spend 
revenue affects how people relate to it. In addition to 
efforts to improve the availability of information on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, there is a need to 
improve the transparency of oil revenues. This might be 
achieved by resuming stalled efforts to implement existing 
legislation on the management of oil revenues, which 
many consider to meet international best practice (Deng 
2015). It might also include furthering conversations to 
join an external oversight initiative such as the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
While an EITI is a largely top-down process to increase 
the transparency of oil finances, there is also scope for 
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bottom-up processes that involve citizens in the oversight 
of oil revenues. This could potentially be achieved through 
the creation of an ‘oil-to-cash’ scheme as proposed by the 
Center for Global Development. This initiative would 
complement an EITI and involves distributing oil revenues 
directly to citizens through cash transfers (Moss 2011). 
In a country with more than 10 million citizens spread 
out over a comparatively large territory, where census 
data is political and of low quality, this would inevitably 
be a complex process. But at the very least, discussions 
regarding such an initiative might be worthwhile, perhaps 
through the IFRWG. 
A further issue is that, while international humanitarian 
and development assistance are critically needed in 
South Sudan, their provision should not be at the cost of 
neglecting the mobilisation of domestic tax revenues. It 
is still wrongly assumed, particularly in the international 
community, that South Sudan is ‘starting from scratch’ 
and that the country collects no local taxes. So while 
diplomatic efforts are critically focused on the peace 
process, there is a need to pay more attention to aid 
programmes to support the development of South 
Sudan’s revenue system. This has been done in other 
contexts: In Rwanda, for example, the UK Department for 
International Development focused on strengthening the 
revenue systems also as a way to foster independen from 
aid. Beyond efforts focused on its fiscal system, donors 
might contribute to participatory budgeting initiatives, 
such as donor-funded Constituency Development Funds 
(CDFs), which enable communities to decide whether and 
how a portion of funds is spent. Further, although donors 
are increasingly reluctant to channel funds through state 
institutions, especially at the local level, there is also scope 
to continue discussions on relevant initiatives, such as the 
Local Service Support to Aid Instrument (LSSAI), in which 
some donor funds go through the ministries of finance 
provided they meet performance targets. 
There are also lingering considerations as to whether 
and how states can generate tax revenues. In many 
developing countries, and particularly other sub-Saharan 
African states, property taxes, business licenses and market 
fees are the main sources of local revenue (Joshi, Prichard 
and Heady 2014). These are also collected in South Sudan, 
but as noted earlier, there remains confusion, rooted in 
history, over which type of authority has the right to 
collect them. 
One way to overcome this is by assessing and 
potentially simplifying revenue-collection processes and fee 
structures. This is unlikely to be a straightforward process 
in South Sudan because, as discussed, of unresolved 
disputes over land ownership in towns and in rural areas. 
Thus subnational revenue tax-collection efforts might 
need to take into account how to link such initiatives with 
land commissions and local justice authorities. Efforts 
to simplify revenue-collection procedures should also be 
harmonised across central and local governments to put an 
end to multiple taxation points. 
There are many ways to collect local taxes and there 
is no consensus on whether one method is better than 
another. For example, in other countries in the region, such 
as Tanzania, local taxes are collected by a several types of 
contracted authorities such as the central government or 
semi-private agents such as market cooperatives (Fjeldstad, 
Katera and Ngalewa 2009). South Sudan might wish 
to explore or experiment with different approaches to 
revenue generation. This might be especially important 
given the country’s diversity. For instance, some groups, 
such as pastoralists, might respond differently to certain 
tax-collection agents or methods than would other types 
of community, such as those that rely on agriculture. 
Approaches might also differ in rural and urban areas. 
With all of this in mind, and given differences in local 
government capacity, various approaches might need to be 
adapted or piloted. 
3. Fiscal systems can play an integral role in 
embedding the peace process. 
Fiscal decentralisation initiatives in South Sudan might 
also play a vital role in embedding peace processes and 
preventing conflict. This is despite the danger that creating 
more states risks exasperating existing tensions between 
and within different tribal or ethnic groups.
One way to potentially mitigate conflict within and 
among states in South Sudan is to ensure that revenues 
are accurate and transparent to communities across states 
and counties nationwide. Given states’ historic difficulty 
in raising taxes, most are likely to remain dependent on 
transfers from the central government. Of the states that 
can generate revenue, much of it comes from trade routes 
from neighbouring countries. The central government 
might need to monitor this imbalance, ideally through a 
forum such as the IFRWG, although similar state-level 
working groups or forums might also be necessary. 
Ensuring that information on the volume of revenues the 
central government transfers to states, and vice versa, is 
accurate and routinely available might also help to dispel 
concerns that the central government favours any groups. 
This in turn increases the importance for each state 
to generate accurate information about its revenues. 
At present it is very likely that some states are better 
equipped to produce robust revenue data than others. 
For example, states with international borders such as the 
former Eastern Equatoria and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal are 
likely to have stronger and more experienced civil service 
capacity in their state revenue authorities than those with 
only internal borders. Fiscal decentralisation initiatives 
might therefore also include nationwide efforts to train 
revenue officials and establish a clear framework for 
making state and county budgets available to the public. 
Finally, fiscal decentralisation efforts might embed 
the peace and strengthen links between citizens and the 
government by ensuring the local provision of public 
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services and closer connections between citizens and 
government authorities. This might be partly tied to the 
ways in which officials are elected and accountable to 
citizens, particularly at the local level. It could also be 
grounded in a clear delineation of roles between elected 
officials and state- appointed civil servants who are 
responsible for executing budgets (Smoke 2013: 15). Both 
of these vital considerations are worth considering and 
harmonising within and across states. 
Another way to potentially strengthen ties between 
local governments and citizens is by organising bottom-
up forums that increase citizens’ participation in local 
government decision-making. This includes participatory 
budgeting initiatives such as the CDFs mentioned earlier 
and which have already been used in some parts of 
South Sudan, and much like donor-led CDFs enable 
communities to vote on how a portion of public funds 
should be spent. These are highly technical mechanisms 
and their application might vary according to local 
politics. Moreover, the evidence on whether they do in 
fact strengthen ties between government and citizens is 
inconclusive. For example, there is a risk that they might be 
dominated or ‘captured’ by elites rather than representing 
wider interests. With these possibilities in mind, user 
committees might be considered at the state level (Manor 
2004). 
8. Service delivery
The announcement of the further subdivision of South 
Sudan has introduced new elements to the debate on 
service delivery. Proponents of 28 or more states argue that 
the move has brought the government closer to the people. 
It is hoped that this will facilitate the provision of public 
services and the ARCSS is providing an opportunity to 
rethink the division of tasks and power between the tiers 
of government in order to best ensure service provision and 
the growth of local institutions.
The failure of state institutions to provide services in 
South Sudan is well documented. It is less obvious why 
exactly these institutions failed to fulfil their mandate. 
The dominant thinking blames the poor delivery of 
services on three main factors: the nascence of the state 
institutions, the inadequacy of fiscal transfers to lower 
tiers of government, and the lack of capacity among South 
Sudan’s public servants, institutions and organisations. 
This  assumption implies that with time, increased fiscal 
transfers to the lower units of administration, and massive 
capacity-building programmes, state institutions in South 
Sudan will be able to perform and deliver. This gives rise 
to the thinking that donors might assume responsibility 
for providing public services through projects managed by 
foreigners until such fiscal transfers and capacity building 
happen. 
There are also challenges in providing services that arise 
from how authority is spread across tiers of government. 
It is useful to consider options for how authority may be 
better allocated in order to improve the provision of public 
services. One possibility is that authority could be devolved 
to allow greater decision-making powers over budgets and 
staffing. The more skilled more local authorities become, 
the better they might be able to provide public services. It 
is through performance that institutions build capabilities 
and meet their responsibilities. 
The provision of public services in South Sudan has 
been dependent on so-called conditional grants. As 
discussed earlier, oil has been the main source of revenue 
for the central government, which transfers a portion 
of this revenue to state governments through block and 
conditional grants. State governments use the block grants 
to finance their own priorities while the conditional grants 
are used to finance priorities set by the central government. 
Due to the limited capacity of the state governments to 
generate their own revenues, they depend on block grants 
to pay for the salaries and running costs of the state and 
local governments. This leaves the provision of public 
services entirely dependent on the conditional grants.
Conditional grants cover the salaries of police officers, 
teachers, health workers, and agricultural extension officers 
among others. Donors have so far covered most of other 
non-salary costs of providing social services. The central 
government determines the priorities and makes plans that 
inform the national budget with little involvement of the 
state and local governments. The state governments employ 
staff and the counties (working with payams and bomas) 
supervise them. While money is transferred by the central 
government to the states and lower tiers of governments in 
the form of block and conditional grants, local supervision 
of public service employees has been largely non-existent. 
Absenteeism and poor performance have been major 
problems since the counties and local administrative units 
lack the necessary supervisory tools – they do not control 
the finances and do not have the power to recruit and 
dismiss staff. As such, service delivery has been limited, and 
local and national institutions have been unable to build 
capacities.
The approach assumes that capacity improves along a 
linear path. It ignores that there is also always a dynamic 
interaction between performance and the development 
of capabilities. By mimicking the ‘form’ of institutions 
that exist elsewhere, South Sudan has become a poorer 
version of the models it has copied. The ministries of 
health, education, agriculture, law enforcement – at both 
the national and state levels – do not perform all of the 
functions of such ministries. They look like ministries, 
but do not function in the ways ministries are assumed 
to function, in the so-called isomorphic mimicry of 
institutions. Institutions that look like institutions but do 
not function like them have placed South Sudan on the 
path of ‘capability traps’, meaning that state institutions do 
not have the capability either to fulfil their functions or to 
build the capabilities needed (see Pritchett, Woolcock and 
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Andrews 2012, 2010). The reality is that capabilities build 
on existing capabilities (Larson, Biar Ajak and Pritchett 
2013), which means that performance and capabilities are 
is inherently linked.
8.1. Service delivery under a new peace settlement
Regardless of the current state of political affairs in South 
Sudan, the ARCSS provides an opportunity to revisit 
the country’s structures of governance with a view to 
facilitating the provision of public services and to rethink 
the structure of the state institutions. The ARCSS also 
offers the chance to rethink the division of authority across 
tiers of government, and to make an honest assessment of 
the capability of each tier. Such an exercise is also crucial 
to developing functional institutions of governance in the 
country.
In the past, the central government assumed the 
planning role without necessarily taking into account 
local priorities. South Sudan’s diversity also means that 
needs are not uniform and that conditional transfers 
are not necessarily the best approach for everything. In 
more remote areas, state governments have been unable 
to deploy and supervise personnel, meaning that local 
administrators often participated little in the governing 
process. 
So a renewed consideration of the function each tier of 
government is useful, if it is done with an eye to identifying 
which government unit can best meet a particular 
function. For instance, local governments are best placed 
to understand local priorities and capabilities in their 
areas and how these can be expanded to handle complex 
tasks. For this expansion to work, local authorities need to 
have planning responsibility and authority, including for 
employing and dismissing personnel. 
The new, more numerous state governments may be best 
suited for ensuring quality control and for working with 
county-level governments in helping them to meet their 
local priorities within the overall policy of the state. The 
national government could articulate the overall vision of 
the country and ensure quality of services nationwide, and 
provide fiscal equalisation across various government tiers. 
This would allow the national government to focus on 
forging national unity and identity while leaving the direct 
provision of services to county governments. Its role would 
be to ensure the quality of public services and develop 
policies that enhance service delivery. This would allow the 
functionaries at each tier of government to perform tasks 
that best match their supervisory capacity. All of these 
scenarios would depend on the political will to devolve 
power and responsibilities from the centre to the state 
level, and from the state to local government. Without this, 
it is unlikely that further administrative division will lead 
to improvements in the provision of public services. 
9. Security 
Security is another service to be addressed. In the past, the 
government has attempted to ensure security by creating 
administrative boundaries, divisions and decentralisation. 
This has been problematic, as discussed above. 
Security continues to be a central concern for the South 
Sudanese public, the government, and the international 
community, for whom the physical security of persons and 
property are a priority. Successive constitutions in South 
Sudan have asserted security as a primary responsibility 
of the national government (for example, Transitional 
Constitution of South Sudan 2011, Part 4 53.1.a).  
Government security arrangements in South Sudan have 
been shaped not only by national politics and decisions, 
but also by internationally supported peace agreements 
including the CPA, the 2006 Juba Declaration and now the 
ARCSS. 
Security provisions have often been highly politicised 
sticking points in reaching such agreements (LeRiche 
2015). The exclusion of military groups from the peace 
agreements has served to make them feel less secure under 
the new arrangements and more willing to fight to protect 
themselves (Young 2012). The wartime experience of 
the 1980s and 1990s created a range of armed groups in 
South Sudan, and the CPA demanded that they either be 
absorbed into the Southern government forces or disarmed 
(or join the then Joint Integrated Units with the northern 
army). The SPLA and other government forces became the 
sole, apparently legitimate, security providers across all 
of South Sudan – a massive departure from the reality of 
security arrangements at the time. Many South Sudanese 
had spent the last two decades fighting the SPLA, which 
now had legal power to control them.  The violence in 
South Sudan since December 2013 can be traced to the 
exclusion of some armed groups ten years before at the 
CPA. 
Security is not only an end in itself, but also a necessary 
condition for the provision of services. For example, many 
NGOs will not work in an area unless there is a basic level 
of security. State and local governments often describe 
their role in service delivery as creating an environment 
of adequate security for NGOs. In addition, the lack of 
security also makes it much harder for government officials 
to function if they cannot travel to more remote areas of 
their administrative units.
How security is envisaged and what needs to happen 
to create these visions of security varies significantly. In 
addition to being a desired end, security practices are also 
often about building authority (Schomerus and De Vries 
2014). The South Sudanese government has, since its 
creation in 2005, focused on its own security. Since 2005, 
the SPLA has fought with Sudan and various southern 
opposition forces including the Cobra Faction and the 
groups that have their historical roots in the South Sudan 
Defence Forces of the 1990s. South Sudanese have often 
been caught up in these government-sponsored wars. 
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9.  Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005: 100. The status of the National Intelligence and Security Service was undetermined.
In this context of its own insecurity, the government 
has invested less time, political might or personnel in 
untangling intercommunity conflicts and protecting 
citizens’ security. Government leaders in Juba have even 
been accused of fuelling much of this violence to promote 
their own interests. The government has also sometimes 
failed to give priority to securing national borders 
(Schomerus and De Vries 2014), although certain areas like 
Heglig have been protected at a cost. 
South Sudanese citizens have made use of a range of 
security providers to push back against violence and build 
a sense of security. These security providers include state 
security mechanisms, but also private security firms and 
local, community-linked defence forces.
9.1. Government provision of security
Since the Anglo-Egyptian government, the provision 
of security has been linked to state administrative 
units. The Anglo-Egyptian government brought 
conflicting neighbouring communities under a common 
administration as a way to resolve conflict and increase 
security, as discussed above. A common, strong central 
authority was assumed to be capable of resolving tensions 
and enforcing a non-violent settlement. The government 
often also attempted to create a common substantive 
customary law within these boundaries in order to ease the 
resolution of conflict and the provision of security. 
The introduction of the ten states of South Sudan did 
not appear to share this motivation. Rather, since 2005, 
the government appears to have drawn administrative 
boundaries (at county and state level) to keep apart 
conflicting communities. This makes it potentially more 
complicated for state governments to coordinate security 
across state boundaries, even when states share common 
security concerns. Since the CPA, there have been 
examples of violence across state boundaries that have 
been particularly difficult to settle. For example, there was 
frequently large-scale raiding between Unity and Warrap 
State. Across these state boundaries, there was no routine 
or accessible means of peaceful judicial redress and less 
political will for peace-building. Conflicts thus became 
more violent and people enacted private forms of justice. 
Even within state boundaries and under a common state 
administration, the government has often failed to provide 
security. The violence in Lakes State and in Jonglei State 
since 2011 is a good example. 
Might the further fragmentation of administrative 
boundaries complicate government security provision? Will 
the additional state boundaries between communities make 
it more difficult to coordinate security and control violence 
over these lines? Does this assume there is a strong central 
government capable of enforcing security? If this weakens 
government security, and if the government is responsible 
for committing some of the worst offences against South 
Sudanese citizens, could this increase their experience of 
security in their daily lives? Will decentralisation keep 
conflicting communities apart? Will it place people at a 
safer distance from government?
In attempts to both increase its own security and also 
move towards a government monopoly on the use of 
violence, after 2005 the government carried out a series 
of disarmament campaigns among non-state actors on a 
state-by-state basis and sometimes through administrative 
structures. Community-level concerns about having to rely 
only on government security prompted some communities 
to violently oppose disarmament. They feared being 
unarmed in the context of security threats from neighbours 
and the government. The use of government violence to 
disarm them only further increased people’s perceived 
need to have other, non-government security providers 
(Saferworld 2012; Rands and LeRiche 2012; Young 2010). 
How will fragmentation affect such efforts to construct the 
government’s monopoly on the use of violence? 
In the CPA, the government security forces were limited 
to the army (i.e. the SPLA), police, prisons and wildlife 
forces.9 The state level was important in these provisions. 
The SPLA is not organised by states, but has its own 
territorial identities and administrative areas, although 
many SPLA divisions have been based close to state 
capitals. Recruitment for the SPLA also took place on a 
state-by-state basis during the war in Heglig and in the 
current civil conflict, in addition to which soldiers have 
used their service in the SPLA to invest in their homes and 
families (Leonardi 2007). Since the CPA, many have moved 
(often without explicit permission) to join army units 
nearer to home. Will ideas of family and belonging play a 
key part in how these security forces operate in practice? 
How will this change with the fragmentation of the states 
and the creation of new identities? 
The state is important for certain parts of government 
security provision. International donors have contributed 
resources and support for capacity-building programmes 
for  state security services. The police service is described 
by the 2011 TCSS as a ‘decentralised’ service organised 
at the national and state levels, but has in reality been 
a deconcentrated force (Chapter II: 155). The 2011 
constitution shifted authority for security towards the 
centre, which undermined the state governors’ role in 
security provision. Nonetheless, many South Sudanese 
still held their state governor (and county commissioner) 
responsible for their personal experience of security. For 
this reason, the governors often coordinate security in their 
state and make alternative provisions if local perceptions 
are that the forces provided by Juba are inadequate. 
Commissioners have also been physically chased from 
their counties when they did not uphold security. State 
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governors have to date been too far removed in distance 
and politically to face this level of accountability. Will this 
change with more states and closer state capitals? Will 
governors become more approachable? What new security 
provisions will governors establish (with or without the 
permission of central government) for their state?
UNMISS has also organised its provision of 
peacekeepers on a state-by-state basis. Will it provide 
peacekeepers and protection of civilians in each of the 
new states of South Sudan? Is this part of the South 
Sudanese expectation in making smaller states? What 
would be the impact on what UNMISS can achieve 
if it remains unchanged or changes to reflect the new 
state arrangements? What new confusion, plurality and 
ambiguity will this bring? How will South Sudanese people 
respond if UNMISS does not have a presence in every new 
state?
9.2. Private / community provision of security
In practice, most South Sudanese rely on local security 
arrangements and trust local, community-linked, armed 
groups for defence and protection. These defence forces 
may be linked to relatively small community groups, such 
as the families of a cattle camp. Alternatively, they may 
have been reconfigured through association with a larger 
political response to government, such as the White Army 
or Arrow Boys (Rigterink, Kenyi and Schomerus 2014; 
Young 2007). 
The configurations of these community defence forces 
have evolved, responding to perceived security threats 
as well as ideas of identity. We know that, after the 
proliferation of counties in 2005, local security groupings 
also evolved (Pendle 2015). It will be important to 
understand how the fragmentation of administrative 
units is likely to change the configuration of local security 
arrangements. In some areas, local leaders such as chiefs 
and spiritual leaders have been figures of authority over 
these community defence forces. These local authorities 
have been able to coordinate violence, but have also 
enforced norms of restraint in combat (Hutchinson and 
Pendle 2015). They have also shown their ability to 
provide peaceful security alternatives through dialogue and 
judicial redress (Hutchinson 2009). If state fragmentation 
brings government security provision closer to the ground, 
what space is left for local leaders to construct their own 
visions of security? Will these local leaders still have 
influence over the existing defence forces? 
While these forces are linked to the community, they are 
not detached from the sphere of local government. Many 
local defence forces often have a working relationship 
with the local and/or state government. The local political 
authority benefits from their provision of security. In 
return, some local authorities provide resources, arms 
or information. In other cases, some local defence forces 
act as an explicit alternative to local government security 
provision, and challenge the local government’s ability 
to provide this service.  The further fragmentation of 
administrative units in South Sudan will change local 
politics and the spheres of local government to which these 
defence forces relate. It is unknown what impact this might 
have on these local defence forces and community-linked 
security provision.
Although these armed defence groups appear to be 
decentralised forms of security, many also have close 
links to the central government and government elites. 
Politicians often foster deconcentrated patronage 
relationships so that local armed men can both offer them 
personal support but also protect their herds or land. 
Therefore, while security arrangements often already 
appear to be decentralised and developed at the most local 
level, national politico-military leaders often still play 
an active role in their formation and activity. It will be 
important to consider how the new administrative units 
might change this deconcentrated relationship of security 
provision.
9.3. Opportunities and challenges for security 
The current situation of change has the potential for 
international, government and central visions of security 
to become more aligned with local understandings. This 
is especially the case if decentralisation and an increase in 
state-level administrative units forces a more accountable 
and responsive state-level government. Additional states 
could make governors more accessible to the people and 
create opportunities for greater accountability, including 
for security provision.
The subdivision into 28 states also adds ambiguity to 
how security should be imagined and provided. There may 
be a further divergence of ideas and fears that security 
will not be realised, which may encourage individuals, 
communities and the government to further expand the 
number of security providers, and turn to increasingly 
extreme means to guarantee security. Both the government 
and private/community actors have the potential to assert 
their control over security through militarised might and 
brutal violence. In a context of uncertainty arising from 
decentralisation, security providers might pre-emptively 
display such violence.
Policy work on security in South Sudan has often 
started with models borrowed from elsewhere that are 
not rooted in the daily lives of South Sudanese. In these 
models, it is generally assumed that the government 
provides security and is not itself a security threat. Thus 
these models take no account of the complex networks of 
relationships and sources of security in South Sudan. Local 
security arrangements and their link to the centre through 
relationships and private conversations are often invisible 
to outside observers. The implications of South Sudan’s 
subdivision for security are unclear, but it is important that 
the broader structure of security forces (including private 
and community forces) is taken into account. We need to 
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better understand how security is happening in practice in 
South Sudan, and then observe how it is changing. 
10. Humanitarian aid
Any major political change occurring in the context of 
the current conflict in South Sudan will have significant 
humanitarian implications. How the situation will unfold 
is largely unknown (although Ethiopia had a similar 
experience in its post-conflict phase), making it difficult 
to predict the types and scale of these implications. This 
is perhaps the first important consequence of the change: 
the uncertainty of how it will be implemented and what it 
means for humanitarian assistance brings confusion that 
will hamper the ability of aid agencies to respond to needs.
Based on what has been learned from the current and 
past conflicts in South Sudan, two types of humanitarian 
consequences may arise from creating more states: 
1. Increased humanitarian needs: A possible 
consequence is an increase in violence, with more 
localised conflict dynamics that will create human 
suffering and displacement. 
2. Increased operational challenges: The creation of 
more states will have an impact on the ability of 
humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to 
people in need.
Since there is little experience of a undertaking a drastic 
administrative subdivision in the midst of conflict, we need 
to consider what are the most important questions from 
the perspective of providing humanitarian aid. 
10.1. Increase in humanitarian needs 
The increase in humanitarian needs may result either 
from people’s decision to move from one state to another, 
creating a large-scale population movement, or from an 
increase in violence. Humanitarian organisations need 
to consider both scenarios based on an analysis of the 
potential impact of new state boundaries and creation 
of new ethnic minorities in particular areas as well as 
conflict dynamics. Will people move because of how the 
boundaries of states are drawn and the ethnic composition 
of that state? Will the lack of political consensus on the 
states lead to further violence? 
Further violence will have a direct impact on the level 
of humanitarian needs. Violence has in the past led to 
mass internal displacement in South Sudan and will do so 
again. Violence may also take new forms: more localised 
dynamics, fragmentation of groups according to local 
interest and power dynamics. This could lead to not 
one, but dozens of localised civil wars with local armed 
actors operating under unclear and changing command 
and control. This may make violence more sporadic and 
increase violations of international humanitarian law 
(IHL). It would also make humanitarian engagement with 
armed actors – to negotiate access or to mitigate violations 
of IHL – more complex.
In South Sudan, population movement has been 
instrumentalised in the past to direct humanitarian 
resources into certain areas. Humanitarian organisations 
need to be aware of this in the coming months as states 
may use large-scale displacement as way to obtain much-
needed resources. 
10.2. Challenges to humanitarian assistance
A further administrative subdivision may make it harder 
to provide humanitarian assistance, whether because of 
increased bureaucratic and logistical obstacles, higher 
formal and informal taxation, more negotiations on access 
based on new contextual and conflict analysis, or more 
fragmented decision-making processes. All of these would 
affect the costs and efficiency of interventions. 
At present, most international humanitarian 
organisations have offices in state capitals allowing them to 
work in that state. It may no longer be feasible to operate 
from the existing hubs. Sub-offices may be challenged by 
political sensitivities of new state authorities that make 
it difficult to have humanitarian agencies effectively 
operating under the jurisdiction of a different state. 
Humanitarian organisations will have to consider their 
own decentralisation: will they set up sub-offices in every 
state, whether 21, 28 or more? Will they set up warehouse 
and logistics hubs in every state? Moreover, the creation 
of new states may increase expectations of decentralised 
services. Will humanitarian agencies be expected to provide 
support to new states in building extra health centres, 
schools, hospitals and water points?
The creation of new states also means that humanitarian 
convoys will have to cross more state borders, adding 
possible delays, more negotiations with state authorities, 
and possibly greater costs in official and informal taxation. 
The time and effort needed to obtain authorisation for 
transporting aid items and implementing humanitarian 
programmes will increase with the involvement of more 
stakeholders. As the new states will need resources to set 
up, there is a risk that they assume these will come from 
humanitarian aid. Pressure on humanitarian organisations 
to take on more traditional developments tasks involving 
to ‘build the capacity’ of local governments by equipping 
them with offices and other means could also increase as 
the current proposal to create new states has no funding 
attached to it. 
These challenges are increased because new state 
structures and interlocutors will not necessarily be in 
place to facilitate humanitarian assistance, thus there 
may be a need to establish new ways of negotiating. 
To deal with the new administrative system, it is likely 
that humanitarian agencies will need to undertake more 
contextual and conflict analysis to identify the conflict 
sensitivities and implications of the impartiality, neutrality 
and independence of humanitarian action. 
To complicate matters still further, the relationship 
between the centre and the new states is as yet unclear. 
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Humanitarian organisations may be torn between decisions 
at the central level and state level. It may become harder 
to make a comprehensive humanitarian response in South 
Sudan in the context of a more fragmented institutional 
landscape of governance. 
The bureaucratic and logistical constraints alongside 
potential increases in taxation and more investment in 
contextual and conflict analysis and access negotiations 
will have significant cost implications for humanitarian 
organisations working in South Sudan in the coming 
months. Honest conversations with the government and 
donors will be required to manage any increased costs. 
Currently, humanitarian organisations are in a wait-
and-see mode. Old structures have been dismantled but 
new functioning structures are not yet in place. This makes 
it difficult for humanitarian organisations to know who 
their interlocutors are. Clarity from the government would 
help humanitarian organisations plan for the changes. 
Will the changes be phased in or take immediate effect? 
The confusion in itself will be costly for humanitarian 
organisations. 
In the meantime, humanitarian organisations need 
to invest time and effort in understanding the many 
changing and complex power dynamics that the creation 
of the new states will imply for their operations. This is 
necessary in order to design conflict-sensitive interventions, 
maintain adherence to humanitarian principles, mitigate 
any potential political manipulation of aid or at least be 
aware of what and how this might play out. Donors need 
to understand the costs and operational implications of 
the creation of further states and support humanitarian 
organisations in responding to the reality on the ground 
rather than focusing on whether the change is politically 
acceptable. This might also require substantial rethinking 
of international engagement in South Sudan. 
11. International engagement in conflict 
resolution
South Sudan has been a focal country for international 
engagement for the past decades. This engagement has 
included emergency humanitarian aid, state-building 
attempts, development aid, reform of the security 
sector, and democratisation. Since the fighting started in 
December 2013, international actors have been explicit 
in condemning all the violence carried out by the warring 
parties in South Sudan (for example, The White House 
2014). The civil war has also thrown up many questions 
about the future of continued international engagement 
and about failures or misconceptions of the past. 
The international community (including the 
governments of China, Norway, the UK and the USA) 
has given priority to its own vision of development, 
democratisation, security and stability in South Sudan. 
Promoting security was often considered synonymous 
with ending conflict in the country. Until December 2013, 
most international actors imagined that security, stability 
and development could be built by strengthening the state. 
Ensuring the protection of the government was also a 
concern.
The experience of war has prompted international 
actors to be more nuanced in their understanding of the 
role of the government in protecting the people of South 
Sudan. For the international community, the war itself is 
the main security threat and human security is now the 
focus. International reports and statements made since 
December 2013 have been careful to attribute blame 
to both warring parties. It is the violence itself that is 
illegitimate and neither party appears to be more or less 
culpable. The enemy and threat to security is the war 
itself, not the South Sudan government or the SPLM/A-iO. 
Recent events, particularly since July 2016, have also put 
into sharp focus the perception within the SPLA that the 
United Nations (UN) and the USA in particular are biased 
towards the opposition, so the provision of aid needs to 
be particularly sensitive to the damage caused by such 
perceptions and developing narratives. 
This situation raises some crucial questions for 
international actors. What can they learn about how their 
previous engagement as they consider the recent violent 
developments in South Sudan? Can international actors 
engage constructively in the newly subdivided South 
Sudan?
Until the fighting resumed in December 2013, the belief 
that only development could bring peace, stability and 
prosperity to South Sudan continued to dominate the aid 
paradigm, despite a 2010 multi-donor evaluation that 
pointed to the lack of evidence for this assumed causality. 
According to the evaluation, power relations, drivers of 
conflict and causes of vulnerability were poorly understood 
and a nuanced analysis largely missing from the design and 
implementation of the most aid programmes (Bennett et al. 
2010).
One important element in this was the failure to address 
local violence. During the CPA interim period, more people 
died in South Sudan than in Darfur, mostly due to different 
kinds of local conflicts. As outlined earlier, South Sudan 
has both ‘devolved’ and ‘deconcentrated’ conflicts and it is 
thus important to approach them with an understanding 
of whether they are driven locally (devolved) or through 
extended power from the centre (deconcentrated).
Conflict patterns in South Sudan reflect local and 
regional peculiarities. Inter- and intra-community fighting 
has and continues to be a key source of violence and 
insecurity. Local conflicts have also increasingly become 
part of complex interconnected conflict systems. Local 
militias ally themselves with regional and national actors; 
local agendas provide the latter with local allies who are 
crucial in maintaining military control, continuing resource 
exploitation, or persecuting political and ethnic enemies. 
The challenge to peace-builders is to take the complexity 
of conflict patterns into account, not by perceiving local 
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conflict dynamics as a mere manifestation of macro-
political cleavages, but as being motivated by both 
top-down causes (regional or national) and bottom-up 
agendas. An approach to peace-building needs to address 
multiple arenas and sources of conflict in a much more 
integrated way than has been the case so far. This is a tall 
order.
Writing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), Autessere has claimed that the most powerful 
peace-builders – diplomats, donors and international 
organisations such as UN and the World Bank – largely 
ignored the fact that much of the violence in the DRC was 
motivated by longstanding bottom-up agendas, whose 
main instigators were villagers, chiefs, or ethnic leaders 
(Autesserre 2009: 60). Even issues usually presented 
as regional or national questions had significant local 
components which fuelled and reinforced the regional 
and national dimensions. Addressing local issues was 
key to ending violence in the DRC, but diplomats and 
UN agencies almost never got involved in resolving 
local conflict. The main reason, she argues, is that 
the peace-building discourse, or what she terms the 
‘postconflict peacebuilding frame’, shaped the international 
understanding of violence and intervention in such a way 
that only macro-political cleavages were addressed. Thus, 
international actors saw holding elections, as opposed to 
local conflict resolution, as an appropriate and effective 
tool for state- and peace-building, and they believed that 
local violence was innate and therefore acceptable even 
in peacetime. The ‘frame’ authorised and justified specific 
practices and policies while precluding others, ‘ultimately 
dooming the peacebuilding efforts’ (Autesserre 2009: 249). 
Peace-building in South Sudan presents some interesting 
parallels. As in the DRC, for a long time the international 
engagement focused on the macro-political cleavages 
between the Khartoum regime and the SPLM, mainly 
concerning the implementation of the CPA. This implied, 
among other things, giving priority to elections that were 
seen as an important step towards political reform and 
sustainable peace. In this perspective, local conflict was 
regarded as an ‘inconvenience’ which needed working 
around rather than embracing a proactive and more 
holistic engagement and commitment to enhancing security 
for vulnerable local populations (Pantuliano, Buchanan-
Smith and Murphy 2008).
 Occurrences of violence were commonly assumed to be 
‘tribal’ or related to cattle rustling rather than symptomatic 
of more structural problems entwined with toxic national 
politics. Thus, according to a study of reintegration of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees returning 
to Jonglei State, the structure and process of local conflicts 
and instability were poorly understood and ‘one-
dimensional negative images of pervasive chaos’ dissuaded 
actors to fully engage with the fundamental issues 
(Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith and Murphy 2008: 76). 
Among donors, there was a longstanding tendency to 
blame Khartoum for everything bad, and for cynically 
exploiting internal divisions in South Sudan. There was 
also a lack of a joint diplomatic and developmental 
approach, including a failure to design aid programmes 
that could help to mitigate rather than exacerbate conflict. 
Support for state-building was mostly focused on vertical 
activities, to the neglect of more horizontal nation-building 
programmes that might have entrenched peace at the 
community level.
As Jok Madut Jok has argued, a peace agreement 
reached on the basis of power-sharing alone is most 
unlikely to lead to genuine peace in South Sudan, 
‘especially if it does not have a conception about how to 
repair the social, ethnic and regional fractures that have 
been caused by nearly 30 years of conflict among and 
between communities’ (Jok 2015: 1). A political settlement 
between elites could bring an end to the fighting between 
the SPLA and forces belonging to SPLM-iO, but this 
will not necessarily stop the fighting between opposed 
communities whose relations have been shattered by 
decades of conflict. 
While real politics in South Sudan have largely seen 
elite bargains as the only way to make progress towards 
peace, the present conflict goes far beyond a struggle 
between rival elites. In some areas, it has devolved into 
blood feuds and serious ethnic strife. In order to restrain 
violence, and promote peace and communal reconciliation, 
it will be necessary to support local efforts. As Hutchinson 
and Pendle (2015) have shown, writing about two Nuer 
prophets, there remain local enclaves of civilian security 
that could lead to a tangible peace in the daily lives of 
more South Sudanese, but it depends on changing current 
perspectives in the international community that tend 
to ignore local, seemingly non-political, actors and so 
overlook and narrow the range of possible solutions. 
Despite being key regional peacemakers, people like the 
two Nuer prophets are often invisible to the international 
community. 
The decision to create more states will add new 
complexities, re-configure local conflicts and change local 
politics in South Sudan. It is unlikely that the international 
community will be able to fully address this complexity, 
but it is essential to take it into account in designing aid 
programmes as well as other types of intervention. To 
argue in favour of more emphasis on local-level efforts and 
for rebuilding state–society relations through bottom-up 
processes rather than relying too much on a top-down 
approach does not mean that it would be advisable to try 
to deal with each and every micro-conflict in South Sudan. 
Local peace initiatives have been happening in different 
parts of the country, and while they deserve more support 
than they usually receive, external forces, including the 
government, are undermining many such initiatives. In 
some cases, there might even be a risk that support for 
local peace-building may lead to further fragmentation, 
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at the expense of support for building national (including 
judicial) institutions. In South Sudan, loyalties may be 
bought and sold in volatile client systems, which often 
makes local interventions unsustainable unless they are 
linked to macro-political processes. The point to remember 
is that macro-level processes do not necessarily determine 
developments at lower levels, and that it is essential to base 
possible interventions on a micro–macro analysis. 
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Part 4: Comparisons and 
conclusion
12. Comparative perspectives
Most African governments introduced provisions for 
decentralisation in the early 1990s, as a part of the 
third wave of democratisation (Dickovick and Wunsch 
2014). In the past 15 years, all constitutional reform or 
new power-sharing pacts in Africa, including in Somalia 
and South Sudan, have included decentralisation in 
some form. The ways in which states implement the 
constitutional provisions for decentralisation vary: some 
abandon local government structures altogether while 
others regularly hold local polls and local government 
structures are empowered both politically and financially. 
Ethiopia, South Sudan’s eastern neighbour, is often cited 
as having successfully implemented decentralisation and 
federalisation and is frequently regarded as a possible 
model for South Sudan. While Ethiopia’s model cannot 
simply be exported, it is still possible to draw lessons from 
its subdivision process that may be relevant for South 
Sudan.  
Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution states that 
every ethnic group (‘Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’) 
has the right to self-determination up to, and including, 
secession. In practice, this translates into a federal system 
with nine regional states and two city administrations. 
The constitution empowers the regions to have their own 
legislative, judicial and executive powers and to levy taxes 
and duties on revenue sources reserved for the states. 
Since the early 2000s, central and regional power and 
authority have been devolved to the local woreda (county) 
administrations as part of a decentralisation reform. 
Federalism in Ethiopia was introduced after the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front’s 
(EPRDF) military victory in 1991. The EPRDF used its 
slogan ‘liberation of the nationalities’ to reach all ethnic 
communities in the country. Establishing new regional and 
local governments also created new ethnic elites and loyal 
party cadres at all levels of the federation. The new cadres, 
in collaboration and often directed by representatives 
of the central party apparatus, managed to side-line 
representatives of the old regime and contain opposition 
locally.
The EPRDF, a coalition of the two major ethnic 
groups in the country, was and remains dominated by 
the militarily superior Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF). Despite this dominance the TPLF attempted to 
co-opt elites of major ethnic groups. This strategy has 
so far managed to stave off a larger conflict of the kind 
that has in the past destabilised the Ethiopian state. At 
the local level, however, disputes have been described and 
experienced along ethnic lines, and have been particularly 
contested along regional state borders – or increasingly 
correspond with boundaries (Asnake 2004). After a 
referendum to determine the boundary between the Somali 
and Oromia Regional States, which appeared to have been 
won overwhelmingly by the Oromia region, the result did 
not lead to a peaceful sharing of resources and co-existence 
of the neighbouring Oromo and Somali people. In some 
areas, the result of the referendum itself became part of 
the on-going conflict. In other areas previous good social 
relations between people of differing ethnic identity along 
the border deteriorated (Abbink 2006; Adugna 2012). 
These examples show that sharper lines have been 
drawn, both within and between ethnic groups. Often this 
process of ethnicisation has disadvantaged historically 
marginalised groups. Some conflicts are therefore 
disassociated from the centre and take place at the local 
level while others remain firmly connected to dynamics 
in the centre. This combination has led some observers to 
describe ethnic federalism as an efficient ‘divide and rule’ 
tactic. 
Since the early 2000s, the EPRDF’s main priority has 
shifted from liberation of the nationalities to national 
development with the aim of making Ethiopia a middle-
income country by 2030. The ruling party has used this 
focus on development to contain new ethnic demands and 
to restrict local regional self-rule by casting dissenting 
ethnic leaders as ‘narrow nationalists’ and ‘rent seekers’ 
(Aalen 2002, 2011). Conflicts are simmering, especially 
around the issue of land, where the interests of national 
development schemes and local ethnic demands collide. 
Thus the EPRDF is creating something akin to a repressive 
peace as a way of maintaining stability and promoting 
aspects of national development. As long as the EPRDF 
delivers development, the party maintains some level of 
legitimacy (Aalen and Asnake 2012). 
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There is no doubt that devolved governance through a 
federal system may also have advantages for South Sudan. 
It has the potential to accommodate ethnic diversity and 
to enable local governments to reach the population by 
providing basic services. For this to happen, however, 
South Sudan must establish stable central power with 
territorial control and a monopoly over the use of violence. 
Lessons from Ethiopia show that using ethnicity through 
federalism and decentralisation requires a fine balancing 
act between control and mobilisation, which not even a 
strong party apparatus like the EPRDF has managed to 
accomplish. While a devolved system can facilitate control 
at local level in a way a centralised system could not, the 
administrative subdivision along ethnic lines has sharpened 
ethnic divides and helped to solidify the previously fluid 
boundaries between ethnic groups. In contexts like South 
Sudan, where resource competition is even more acute 
than in Ethiopia and there is little respect for democracy 
and individual rights, the process is likely to lead to 
increased tension between and within ethnic groups and 
to a continuous stream of demands for the creation of new 
ethnic units. By its very nature, therefore, ethnic-based 
federalism may be a source of instability and conflict. 
Another major difference between Ethiopia and South 
Sudan is latter’s natural resource wealth. The existence of 
natural resources, particularly if they are spread unevenly 
across a territory, significantly influences dynamics of 
governance, identity and conflict. 
13. Conclusion: Opportunities and 
challenges
South Sudan’s subdivision has created new realities while 
invigorating debate about other new possibilities. It also 
highlights the lack of trust in government decisions, both 
in terms of where it is heading and with regard to how far 
it will be possible to implement them. 
It is also important to stress that the renewed debate 
also offers a major opportunity, particularly as South 
Sudan continues to face political struggle and violence at 
the centre. This report has highlighted these challenges and 
opportunities – many of which turn out to be two sides of 
the same coin. Something that is clearly a challenge is also 
likely to provide an opportunity. 
It is clear that one prerequisite for improved governance 
in the new structures is trust between the various levels 
of government, between different levels of government 
across states, and between government and citizens. Such 
trust requires transparent implementation and division of 
labour and resources between levels of government based 
on capacities rather than on personal relationships and 
informal hierarchies between branches of the new system. 
This is challenging right now, but also points towards 
what needs to be done to address it – namely, interaction, 
information exchange, taking small steps towards staffing 
government tiers with the personnel best qualified to tackle 
these tremendously complex tasks. 
Any further division of South Sudan’s administration 
– or indeed the reversal of such division, should it come 
to that – will lead to a period in which the balance of 
power will need to be renegotiated. This is not only 
the case between the deconcentrated and devolved 
systems of government but also within the devolved 
structures. An example from earlier experiences of such 
re-adjustment occurred during the interim period, when 
municipalities were created in addition to the rural 
counties. Commissioners of rural counties with a big town, 
Yei for instance, used to be relatively powerful compared 
to less strategic rural counties. With the establishment 
of municipalities and thus mayors, the powers of 
County Commissioners were greatly reduced without 
the corresponding change of responsibilities. Periods of 
re-adjustment followed these structural changes. It is likely 
that a similar process will occur with the establishment 
of new states, some of which no longer have more 
than one county. The precise division of tasks between 
commissioners and governors will need to be partly 
determined in practice, as will be the division of labour in 
resolving local conflicts related to land.  
Provision of services – including security – is tightly 
linked to revenue creation and capabilities. New 
administrative structures require the states to examine 
their own revenue-generating capabilities – which offers an 
opportunity to realistically assess what sources of income 
South Sudan has at the local level – and whether there are 
other ways of working with citizens to assure the provision 
of essential services. 
All these considerations follow trajectories of South 
Sudan’s subdivision debate. They touch on the connection 
between authority, rights and territory and highlight the 
incentives created throughout these trajectories. They link 
political structures with territory, which in turn affects 
how communities interact. Changes in identity are both 
a reaction to this while also pushing it forwards. Any 
consideration of what administrative structure might suit 
South Sudan needs to be informed by an understanding of 
these trajectories. 
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